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THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
Gregory N. Mandel* 
Abstract 
Though the success of intellectual property law depends upon its 
ability to affect human perception and behavior, the public psychology 
of intellectual property has barely been explored. Over 1,700 U.S. 
adults took part in an experimental study designed to investigate 
popular conceptions of intellectual property rights. Respondents’ views 
of what intellectual property rights ought to be differed substantially 
from what intellectual property law actually provides, and popular 
conceptions of the basis for intellectual property rights were contrary to 
commonly accepted bases relied upon in legal and policy decision-
making. Linear regression analysis reveals previously unrecognized 
cultural divides concerning intellectual property law based upon 
respondents’ income, age, education, political ideology, and gender. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The success of intellectual property law depends upon its ability to 
influence human behavior pursuant to the widely accepted incentive 
theory of intellectual property. Under the incentive rationale, 
intellectual property law is built on the premise that providing creators 
with certain rights will induce them to produce, distribute, and 
commercialize more intellectual works of greater creativity than they 
otherwise would. Intellectual property law also depends on behavioral 
effect for compliance. The ease of copying, enabled by modern 
technological advances, combined with the high transaction costs of 
enforcement, makes widespread voluntary compliance necessary for the 
intellectual property system to function as desired. 
Because intellectual property law is designed to operate through 
producing a behavioral response, public understanding of intellectual 
property law plays an integral role in the success or failure of the 
intellectual property system. Public understanding can influence the 
activities of potential intellectual property creators and users, as well as 
the decision-making of jurors, judges, and legislators. It can also affect 
issue framing and public discourse among voters, the media, and the 
general public. Despite the central importance of public perception and 
human behavior to the success of the intellectual property system, 
popular understanding of intellectual property rights has barely been 
explored. This article presents the first investigation of the relationship 
between popular conceptions of what intellectual property rights should 
be and what intellectual property rights actually are, across different 
types of creative works. The results have important implications for 
understanding compliance with intellectual property rights, how 
2
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effectively intellectual property law promotes the production of creative 
works, and how intellectual property law is applied. The results also 
elucidate the ability of law to shape human perception and behavior 
more generally.1 
Utilizing a series of intellectual property scenario experiments given 
to a national sample of over 1,700 American adults, the study reported 
here examines three primary issues: (1) whether and how popular 
conceptions of intellectual property rights differ from actual intellectual 
property law; (2) whether and how popular conceptions of intellectual 
property rights vary between artistic versus technological creative 
endeavors; and (3) how the popular understanding of the basis for 
intellectual property rights compares to the primary rationale applied in 
policy and legal decision-making. 
The study results demonstrate that respondents’ views of what 
should be protected by intellectual property rights differ substantially 
from the actual provisions of the law. Public perception of what 
intellectual property rights should be also varies, in an inconsistent 
manner, between the areas of copyright and patent law. Because 
intellectual property law is designed to induce certain behavior, the 
public disconnect suggested by these results indicates that intellectual 
property law may not be able to produce its desired effects concerning 
either the promotion of creative activity or compliance with intellectual 
property rights.2 That is, people may not invest in, produce, or 
commercialize creative activity to the extent anticipated by intellectual 
property law, and may not comply with intellectual property law even in 
situations where they intend to respect the rights of others. 
The study results also reveal that popular conceptions of the basis for 
intellectual property rights are contrary to commonly accepted bases 
relied upon in legal and policy decision-making. Whereas intellectual 
property law is designed based on an incentive theory of intellectual 
property rights,3 lay people understand intellectual property law to be 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Cf. W. Jonathan Cardi, Randall D. Penfield & Albert H. Yoon, Does Tort Law Deter 
Individuals? A Behavioral Science Study, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 567 (2012) (reporting 
experimental studies on potential tort liability in an effort to examine the “widely accepted but 
grossly undertested assumption that tort liability in fact deters tortious conduct”). 
 2. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 
1745, 1777 (2012) (“Incentives—the underpinning of intellectual property—work only if they 
motivate authors and inventors to create (or indirectly stimulate others, like firms, to encourage 
them to create).”); Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. L. 
REV. 72, 74–75 (2012) (discussing how a lack of awareness of patent law on the part of 
potential creators complicates the incentive theory of patent law); Tom R. Tyler, Compliance 
with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
219, 224 (1996) (“The effectiveness of intellectual property law is therefore heavily dependent 
on gaining voluntary cooperation with the law.”). 
 3. See infra Section I.B. 
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based on the natural entitlement of authors and inventors to their 
intellectual creations.4 While legal and political experts tend to view 
intellectual property law from one perspective, the public sees it from 
another. These findings have significant implications for intellectual 
property policy, as the disconnect between public perception and 
intellectual property rights can undermine the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the law.5 
The results of these experiments shed light on contemporary high-
profile intellectual property debates, such as battles concerning the Stop 
Online Piracy Act6 (SOPA) and PROTECT IP Act of 20117 (PIPA), the 
six-year-long patent reform legislation debate in the U.S. Congress, and 
numerous recent intellectual property cases before the Supreme Court. 
Regression analysis of participant study responses reveals that having 
lower income, being older, being more educated, and having less 
experience with intellectual property all correlate with a desire for 
stronger intellectual property protection. Further, for certain intellectual 
property rights, conservatives prefer stronger intellectual property rights 
than liberals, women prefer stronger rights than men, and minorities 
prefer stronger rights than whites. These results indicate previously 
unrecognized cultural divides over intellectual property that are 
expected to shape the public discourse and outcomes of future 
intellectual property debates. 
Prior research has investigated a number of manners in which human 
decision-making concerning intellectual property is “boundedly 
rational.”8 Because people are not perfect rational actors, this research 
indicates, they will not make fully rational decisions concerning 
intellectual property endeavors and activity. For example, it appears that 
people tend to irrationally overvalue the quality of their own creations 
due to endowment and creativity effects,9 and cannot accurately 
evaluate whether inventions merit patent protection due to the hindsight 
                                                                                                                     
 4. Some scholars support this natural rights basis for intellectual property, as opposed to 
the incentive basis. See infra Section I.B. 
 5. E.g., Robert MacCoun et al., Do Citizens Know Whether Their State Has 
Decriminalized Marijuana? Assessing the Perceptual Component of Deterrence Theory, 5 REV. 
L. & ECON. 347 (2009) (discussing lack of support for the theory that changes in the law will 
produce corresponding changes in behavior, based on data concerning citizens’ perceptions of 
marijuana possession legal penalties); cf. Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on 
Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 380–82 (2006) (discussing how the 
public’s perception of governmental institutions as legitimate contributes to effective democratic 
governance). 
 6. H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). 
 7. S. 968, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). 
 8. See infra Part IV. 
 9. Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 31, 31–32 (2011). 
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bias.10 
The studies reported here take these concerns a step further. Even if 
we could de-bias the cognitive heuristics that cloud intellectual property 
decision-making, human beings still would not operate as desired 
rational actors in the intellectual property sphere because most people 
do not comprehend what the law is and do not concur with the rationale 
on which intellectual property laws are based. As a result, the 
intellectual property system will have a hard time functioning as 
designed. A behavioral system cannot operate properly if the actors 
within the system function pursuant to a different set of behavioral 
determinants than the model on which the system is founded.11 
Part I of this Article provides an introduction to patent and copyright 
law and policy. It also explains why the public psychology of 
intellectual property is crucial to the success of the intellectual property 
system. Part II reports the methodology and results of a series of four 
intellectual property scenario experiments designed to investigate the 
public psychology of intellectual property. Part III discusses the 
implications of the experimental results for the existing behavioral 
model of intellectual property law and analyzes the repercussions of this 
new understanding for current intellectual property debates. Part IV of 
this Article places the current intellectual property study within a 
broader field of literature on the psychology of ownership, a field that, 
until now, has largely focused on the ownership of physical property. 
This Article concludes with recommendations for further avenues of 
research. 
I.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
Evaluating the relationship between public perception and 
intellectual property rights requires understanding intellectual property 
law and policy in the first instance. This section provides a brief 
introduction to intellectual property law and how it is expected to 
function by affecting the behavior of both the creators and users of 
intellectual property. The interplay between intellectual property law 
and public perception is highlighted using examples from several 
current, high-profile intellectual property law debates.12 The section 
concludes with a discussion of how the public psychology of 
intellectual property rights mediates the success of the intellectual 
property system through its influence upon intellectual property 
                                                                                                                     
 10. Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration That the 
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1393–95 (2006). 
 11. See Ori Friedman, First Possession: An Assumption Guiding Inferences About Who 
Owns What, 15 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 290, 290 (2008) (noting that “[o]wnership of 
property is an important determinant of behavior”); see also Tyler, supra note 2, at 224. 
 12. See infra Section I.C. 
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creators, users, jurors and judges, legislators, and the general public. 
A.  Copyright and Patent Law 
The Constitution grants Congress patent and copyright authority in a 
single Intellectual Property Clause, and each body of law is directed to 
the same constitutional purpose: “promot[ing] . . . [p]rogress.”13 
Congress passed the first patent act at the beginning of its first term in 
1790,14 and the first copyright act one month later.15 Despite these 
similar origins, there is a striking divergence between the rights 
accorded to authors and artists (protected by copyright law) and the 
rights accorded to inventors (protected by patent law).16 
Copyright law protects original works of authorship, including 
literary, dramatic, musical, and artistic work.17 Patent law protects 
product and process inventions.18 These two fields of intellectual 
property law differ in the methods for acquiring rights, standards for 
obtaining protection, rights afforded by an intellectual property grant, 
and the scope and duration of such rights. 
Copyright law provides automatic protection for an original work of 
authorship the moment the work is fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression, such as being written down or recorded.19 No formal 
application, registration, or publication is required.20 Patent law, on the 
other hand, requires an applicant to go through a lengthy and expensive 
patent prosecution process to convince the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office that the invented subject matter satisfies a series of 
validity requirements.21 In order to secure a patent, an applicant must 
                                                                                                                     
 13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“[The Congress shall have Power] [t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries[.]”). 
 14. An Act to promote the progress of useful Arts, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 
1793). 
 15. An Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and 
books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times therein mentioned, ch. 15, 
§ 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (repealed 1802). 
 16. The study reported here focuses on patent and copyright law, leaving trademark law, 
the third primary strand of intellectual property, to future work. While patent and copyright law 
are based on incentive models, trademark law is generally recognized to have a different 
foundation based on reducing consumer search costs, and therefore raises different issues 
concerning public perceptions. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 166–67 (2003). 
 17. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). 
 18. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 19. 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
 20. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 408 (2010). To bring an infringement action, the copyright owner 
must ordinarily have registered the copyright with the U.S. Copyright Office. Id. § 411(a). 
 21. 35 U.S.C. § 131; John Gladstone Mills III et al., Relation Between Invention and 
Patents, in PATENT LAW BASICS § 1:25 (2012). 
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demonstrate, among other things, that the invention is new, useful, and 
nonobvious, and must adequately disclose how to make and use the 
invention.22 In contrast, in order to merit a copyright, an author is only 
required to meet a de minimis originality standard.23 
Copyright protection, though easier to obtain, is narrower in scope 
than patent protection. A copyright protects its owner against another 
person copying (either wholly or to create a derivative work), 
distributing, or publicly performing or displaying the copyrighted work 
itself.24 A copyright does not provide protection against another person 
independently creating the same or similar work and distributing or 
displaying that independently created work.25 A patent, conversely, 
vests its owner with the right to prevent anyone else from making, 
using, selling, offering for sale, or importing the patented subject 
matter.26 Thus, a patent protects against independent creation, while a 
copyright does not. Further, a patent grants rights to a field of subject 
matter, not just an individual work. The scope of the patent-protected 
field is defined by a patent’s claims that, in almost every case, are 
broader than the individual embodiment of an invention.27 A copyright, 
on the other hand, only protects against copying the particular work; it 
does not establish a sphere of protection.28 
Copyright protection lasts much longer than patent protection. A 
copyright, in general, lasts for the life of the author plus an additional 
seventy years.29 A patent term runs twenty years from the date of the 
patent application,30 providing an average of about seventeen years of 
protection from the time of a patent grant.31 Neither term can be 
renewed.32 
The broad differences between copyright and patent law are due to a 
variety of factors, including path-dependent histories, differing subject 
                                                                                                                     
 22. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03, 112. 
 23. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“[T]he requisite 
level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.”); see also Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) (“[A] very modest grade of art has in it 
something irreducible, which is one man’s alone. That something he may copyright unless there 
is a restriction in the words of the act.”). 
 24. See 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 25. E.g., Feist, 499 U.S. at 361; see also Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249.  
 26. 35 U.S.C. § 271. 
 27. Laitram Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 863 F.2d 855, 865 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Tex. 
Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 805 F.2d 1558, 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 28. 17 U.S.C. § 102; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56–57 (1976). 
 29. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). 
 30. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). 
 31. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1). 
 32. 17 U.S.C. § 302; Edward C. Walterscheid, The Remarkable—and Irrational—
Disparity Between the Patent Term and the Copyright Term, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 233, 255–57 (2001). 
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matter, and differing political economies. In addition, I have  argued in 
previous work that certain of these differences map remarkably 
consistently onto (now largely debunked) social stereotypes about 
differences between right-brain artists and left-brain inventors, and that 
such socio-cultural creativity stereotypes have influenced patent and 
copyright doctrine.33 Regardless of the basis for the divergence, the 
patent and copyright systems function very differently in both the 
acquisition and scope of rights provided by an intellectual property 
grant. 
B.  Intellectual Property Policy 
Despite the substantial doctrinal differences between copyright and 
patent law, there is significant convergence in legal and policy analysis 
concerning the objectives of the copyright and patent systems and how 
these systems are expected to function. Consistent with the 
Constitution’s mandate that the power to enact intellectual property 
laws is granted in order to “promote the [p]rogress,”34 both Congress35 
and the Supreme Court36 have repeatedly explained that intellectual 
property law exists to incentivize authors and inventors to produce and 
distribute creative works. This utilitarian incentive theory of intellectual 
property law is largely shared by numerous experts in a variety of 
fields.37 
                                                                                                                     
 33. Gregory N. Mandel, Left-Brain Versus Right-Brain: Competing Conceptions of 
Creativity in Intellectual Property Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 322–25 (2010). 
 34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 35. See NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY (J. Witherspoon 
ed., 1978) [hereinafter NONOBVIOUSNESS] (discussing the legislative history of the 1952 
amendments to the Patent Act, which were based on utilitarian incentive objectives); Joe Matal, 
A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. BAR. J. 
435, 435 (2012) (discussing the legislative history of the America Invents Act). 
 36. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012) 
(“[T]he promise of exclusive rights provides monetary incentives that lead to creation, 
invention, and discovery.”); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he grant of exclusive rights [in the Intellectual Property clause] is intended to 
encourage the creativity of ‘Authors and Inventors.’”); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. 
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of 
authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” (alteration in original)); 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“[C]opyright 
supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (granting patents and copyrights is 
“intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors”); United States v. 
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The sole interest of the United States and 
the primary object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by 
the public.” (quoting Fox Film Corps. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)). 
 37. Fromer, supra note 2, at 1750–51; e.g., id. at 1746 (“According to the dominant 
American theory of intellectual property, copyright and patent laws are premised on providing 
creators with . . . incentive[s] to create artistic, scientific, and technological works . . . .”); 
8
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The incentive theory of intellectual property law is based on the 
rationale that, absent intellectual property protection, there would be a 
market failure in innovation.38 This would occur because new 
inventions and artistic works are generally nonexcludable and 
nonrivalrous.39 Absent intellectual property protection, creators could 
not prevent the widespread copying and distribution of new inventions 
and works of authorship once they were publically disclosed. Authors 
and inventors, therefore, could not profit from the full extent of their 
intellectual creation’s use or social value. As a result, potential 
inventors and authors would be less inclined to invest substantial effort 
and resources into intellectual creation in the first instance.40 Too little 
innovation and artistic creation would occur.  
Intellectual property protection seeks to solve this potential market 
failure, according to incentive theory, by granting creators certain rights 
in their creative work.41 These intellectual property rights prevent others 
from copying or distributing the work without permission. Intellectual 
property law makes creative works excludable, which allows the 
producer to capture greater profits from an intellectual creation. This 
brings the private benefits of a creative work more in line with its social 
value.42 Intellectual property rights thus provide an economic incentive 
                                                                                                                     
Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An 
Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 (2010) (“IP, perhaps more than any other substantive 
area of law, is grounded in the rational actor model . . . . [a]ccording [to which] the monopolistic 
rights granted by copyrights and patents exist to provide economic incentives to creators.”); 
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 16, at 4 (“[I]t is acknowledged that analysis and evaluation of 
intellectual property law are appropriately conducted within an economic framework that seeks 
to align that law with the dictates of economic efficiency.”). 
 38. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 12–13 (5th ed. 2010) (“The result [of not providing exclusive rights in 
intellectual property], according to economic theory, would be an underproduction of books and 
of other works of invention and creation with similar public goods characteristics.”); cf. Harper 
& Row Publishers, 471 U.S. at 558 (“[T]he Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of 
free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright 
supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 
201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant 
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain 
is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 
‘Science and useful Arts.’”).  
 39. MERGES, supra note 38, at 12; Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of 
Copyright Law: Unbundling the Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664, 1670 (2012). 
 40. Fromer, supra note 2, at 1751; Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside 
of Intellectual Property’s Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 926–27 (2010) (“If innovators can 
only recover their marginal cost of production, they will lack the incentive to create the 
information good in the first place.”). 
 41. See Balganesh, supra note 39, at 1670. 
 42. See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 
276 (2007); see also Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 40, at 926–27. 
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to induce potential authors and inventors to create, distribute, and 
commercialize more creative works than they would absent intellectual 
property protection.43 
Though the incentive basis is the dominant conceptual basis for 
intellectual property law, it is not the only accepted basis. Other theories 
of intellectual property rights have also been propounded. Some 
scholars rely on John Locke’s labor theory of property rights and other 
similar concepts to argue that authors and inventors should hold natural 
rights in their creative works.44 This equitable perspective views 
individuals as automatically entitled to the fruits of their efforts.45 
Natural rights theory supports intellectual property rights on the basis 
that a creator is morally entitled to control the copying and distribution 
of inventions or artistic creations produced as a result of the creator’s 
own labor and effort.46 
Other scholars contend, based on reasoning from Kant and Hegel, 
that intellectual property rights can serve an expressive function for 
creators, allowing greater human flourishing and cultural development, 
and should be protected for this reason.47 Just as individuals use 
physical property, such as homes or clothing, to express their 
                                                                                                                     
 43. There are a number of variations on the incentive theory of intellectual property, 
particularly concerning what the law actually is or may be designed to incentivize, including the 
creation, distribution, or commercialization of intellectual works. See generally Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989) (discussing various incentive theories of patent law). The differences 
among these various incentive theories are not significant for the purposes of this Article.  
 44. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and 
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540 (1993). 
See generally Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 296–
330 (1988) (discussing Locke’s labor theory as it relates to intellectual property rights). Some 
scholarship not only supports the natural rights theory of intellectual property, but makes a 
historical argument that this was an originally understood basis for such rights. PAUL CLEMENT 
ET AL., THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 1 
(2012) (“[F]rom its inception[,] copyright was seen not merely as a matter of legislative grace 
designed to incentivize productive activity, but as a broader recognition of individuals’ inherent 
property right in the fruits of their own labor.”); Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of 
Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550–1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1257 (2001) (“It is my 
intention, nonetheless, to offer a modest challenge to the prevailing view that the ideas of the 
natural rights philosophers did not influence the early development of patent law.”). 
 45. ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 33–41 (2011). 
 46. See Gordon, supra note 44, at 1543 (“[A]ll persons have a duty not to interfere with 
the resources others have appropriated or produced by laboring on the common. This duty is 
conditional, and is a keystone in the moral justification for property rights.” (footnote omitted)); 
Hughes, supra note 44, at 297 (“Locke proposes that . . . there are enough unclaimed goods so 
that everyone can appropriate the objects of his labors without infringing upon goods that have 
been appropriated by someone else.”). 
 47. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 44, at 1535–36; Margaret Jane Radin, Market-
Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1851–52 (1987). See generally Hughes, supra note 44, 
at 330–65 (discussing Hegel’s personality justification for intellectual property rights). 
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personality,48 an individual’s intellectual creations may be used in a 
similar manner. 
 Consistent with these alternative notions of intellectual property 
rights, several European countries endow authors with significant 
“moral rights” in their works.49 These moral rights can include a right of 
attribution (requiring that an author of a work be identified) and a right 
of integrity (permitting the author of a work to prevent others from 
distorting the work in a way that would injure the author’s reputation).50 
In the United States, however, alternative foundations for intellectual 
property rights tend to play less of a role than incentive-based rationales 
in most expert and policy discourse concerning the actual operation and 
scope of intellectual property law.51 
C.  Intellectual Property Debates 
Considering their similar histories and objectives, it is striking how 
little patent law and copyright law cohere. Their broad doctrinal 
differences are often accepted without question in many intellectual 
property law circles. This is likely a result of the long-standing nature of 
the differences and their being the status quo for those trained in 
intellectual property doctrine and policy. Both the doctrinal structure 
and the policy basis for intellectual property law, however, are currently 
under pressure due to technological evolution. This evolution has 
resulted in the development and distribution of new types of creative 
works, along with new means for copying and disseminating them. 
These changes have manifested in several recent, high-profile debates 
concerning copyright infringement on the Internet, patent reform 
legislation, and a number of intellectual property cases before the 
Supreme Court. 
                                                                                                                     
 48. Nestor M. Davidson, Property and Identity: Vulnerability and Insecurity in the 
Housing Crisis, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119, 119–20 (2012). 
 49. E.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, “European Copyright Code”—Back to First Principles (With 
Some Additional Detail), 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 265, 278–80 (2010); ROBERTA 
ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE 
UNITED STATES 37–47 (2010). 
 50. Ginsburg, supra note 49, at 278–80. 
 51. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 2, at 1750–51 (“The Supreme Court, Congress, and 
many legal scholars consider utilitarianism the dominant purpose of American copyright and 
patent law.” (footnote omitted)); John P. Conley & Christopher S. Yoo, Nonrivalry and Price 
Discrimination in Copyright Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1801, 1802 (2009) (“[B]oth sides 
[in debates over copyright laws] generally frame the arguments in largely economic terms.”); 
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1597–99 
(2003) (“To a greater extent than any other area of intellectual property, courts and 
commentators widely agree that the basic purpose of patent law is utilitarian: We grant patents 
in order to encourage invention. While there have been a few theories of patent law based in 
moral right, reward, or distributive justice, they are hard to take seriously as explanations for the 
actual scope of patent law.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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The Stop Online Piracy Act52 (SOPA) and PROTECT IP Act of 
201153 (PIPA) were the House and Senate versions, respectively, of 
bills designed to thwart the widespread availability of movies, music, 
and other media accessible on the Internet in violation of copyright 
law.54 These bills were promoted by large media lobbies, including the 
Motion Picture Association of America and the Recording Industry 
Association of America, as well as by the United States Chamber of 
Commerce.55 SOPA and PIPA were intended to operate by penalizing 
or prohibiting Internet search engines and web payment sites from 
providing access or payment to websites distributing material in 
violation of United States copyright laws.56 
Initially, SOPA and PIPA had widespread, bipartisan support in 
Congress and appeared headed towards adoption as legislation.57 In 
December 2011, however, a collection of technology and Internet 
companies came out in strong opposition to the bills based on concerns 
about Internet censorship, the impact of the bills on free speech, and the 
potential for the legislation to stifle online innovation.58 Congressional 
leaders were taken aback by the rapid groundswell of public opposition 
to SOPA and PIPA, and in January 2012, they indefinitely postponed 
votes and other action on the legislation.59 This series of events may 
have been caused in part by the disconnect between expert and lay 
perspectives on intellectual property. The legislative debates concerning 
reform in this area are not likely over. Media piracy remains a 
significant challenge for certain industries, and concerns about how to 
address copyright infringement on the Internet continue to fester, raising 
the likelihood that Congress will consider revised versions of SOPA and 
PIPA in the future.60 
                                                                                                                     
 52. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). 
 53. Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual 
Property Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). 
 54.  Jenna Wortham, A Political Coming of Age for the Tech Industry, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/technology/web-wide-protest-over-two-
antipiracy-bills.html. 
 55. Id. 
 56. H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. §§ 102(c)(1), (c)(2)(A)(i), (c)(2)(B)–(C)(i), (c)(4)(A) (1st 
Sess. 2011); S. 968, 112th Cong. §§ 3(d)(1), (d)(2)(C)–(D), (e)(1) (1st Sess. 2011). 
 57. Jonathan Weisman, After an Online Firestorm, Congress Shelves Antipiracy Bills, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/technology/senate-postpones-
piracy-vote.html; see, e.g., Edward Wyatt, Lines Drawn on Antipiracy Bills, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/technology/lines-are-drawn-on-legislation-
against-internet-piracy.html.  
 58. Wyatt, supra note 57; Wortham, supra note 54.  
 59. Weisman, supra note 57.  
 60. See Amy Chozick, Tech and Media Elite are Likely to Debate Piracy, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/10/business/media/tech-and-media-elite-are-
likely-to-debate-piracy.html. 
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Patent legislation has also been a recent hot topic. In September 
2011, Congress passed the America Invents Act (AIA),61 introducing 
the most significant statutory changes to patent law in over half a 
century. The AIA represents the culmination of six years of vociferous 
patent reform debates in Congress.62 These debates pitted some of 
America’s largest industries against each other, as the software and 
information technology industries began to see the patent system as 
producing a drag on innovation, while the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology sectors feared that any weakening of patent laws would 
wreak havoc on innovation in their fields.63 The debates over patent 
reform made it clear that different industries interact with the patent 
system in different ways, and that patent law affects innovation in 
different industries in different manners. 
Concurrent with these legislative activities, the Supreme Court has 
been active in the intellectual property arena as well. Issues in recent, 
hotly-debated cases include copyright liability for peer-to-peer file 
sharing,64 the types of subject matter eligible for patent protection,65 
whether copyright protection can be extended to works already in the 
public domain,66 reconsideration of the inventiveness standard for 
patent protection,67 and the remedies for patent infringement.68 
Numerous amicus briefs were filed in each of these cases, many 
concerning the potential effect of a decision on the broader functioning 
of the patent or copyright systems,69 and these cases received more 
                                                                                                                     
 61. America Invents Act, S. 23, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). 
 62.  See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS 
CAN SOLVE IT 4, 100 (2009). 
 63. Id. at 100–01. 
 64. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 (2005) (holding that 
distributors of peer-to-peer file sharing software can be liable for copyright infringement if 
“affirmative steps [are] taken to foster infringement”). 
 65. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012) 
(holding that a method for obtaining correlations between blood test results and patient heath 
was not patent-eligible subject matter because it incorporates a law of nature); Bilski v. Kappos, 
130 S. Ct. 3218, 3229–30 (2010) (holding that a method for hedging losses through investments 
was not patent-eligible subject matter because it was an abstract idea). 
 66. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012) (holding that Congress can take works 
out of the public domain for purposes of copyright and patent protection). 
 67. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419-20 (2007) (effectively increasing 
the stringency of the nonobviousness patent requirement). 
 68. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392-94 (2006) (holding that patent 
owners are not necessarily entitled to injunctions for patent infringement). 
 69. E.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Sharman Networks Ltd. in Support of Respondents, 
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480), 2005 WL 508106, at 
*5; Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n in Support of Respondent, Mayo 
Collaborative Servs v. Prometheus Labs, Inc., 132 S. Ct 1289 (2011) (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 
5373692, at *2-3; Brief of Am. Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Golan 
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media attention than almost any other intellectual property cases in 
history. 
Each of these intellectual property debates focuses on how well 
intellectual property law serves its traditional incentive function, and on 
what effects changes to the law would have on the investment, 
production, and distribution of creative works. The debates, however, in 
general largely assume fully informed rational actors making decisions 
about how much time, energy, and resources to invest in creative 
efforts, about whether to respect the intellectual property rights of 
others, and about how to decide intellectual property cases. Whether 
these assumptions are accurate depends, in part, on public perception 
and understanding concerning the basis for and manner of intellectual 
property ownership. 
D.  Influence of the Public Psychology of Intellectual Property 
The public psychology of intellectual property rights matters because 
this perception will influence the behavior of numerous human actors 
throughout the intellectual property system.70 Public perception and 
understanding is pertinent to varying degrees in other fields of law as 
well, but it rarely plays as significant a role as it does for intellectual 
property. While intellectual property law must affect human psychology 
and behavior ex ante in order to function as designed, most other legal 
regimes can achieve significant objectives after the fact. For example, 
criminal law can provide retribution, restraint, and rehabilitation;71 tort 
law can compensate victims of accidents;72 statutes of limitations can 
foreclose claims;73 and environmental law can require remediation74—
                                                                                                                     
v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2011) (No. 10-545), 2011 WL 3561887, at *4-5; Brief for Practicing 
Patent Attorneys as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 
550 U.S. 398 (2006) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 2967756, at *1-2; Brief for United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 
(2006) (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 622120, at *1. 
 70. See, e.g., MacCoun et al., supra note 5, at 347 (discussing how public perception of 
marijuana laws will affect behavioral decisions concerning compliance). 
 71. Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive Detention as 
Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1440–41 (2001) (discussing retribution, restraint, 
and rehabilitation as various goals of criminal law). 
 72. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4 (W. Page 
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (recognizing compensation as “a powerful factor influencing tort 
law”). 
 73. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2006) (codifying federal statute of limitations for noncapital 
crimes); WILLIAM BALLANTINE, A TREATISE ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (21 JAC. 1. C. 
16.) 1-5 (1810) (discussing historic statute of limitations law). 
 74. WILLIAMS H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 683 (2d ed. 1994) (identifying 
remediation of contamination as “[a]n overriding purpose of CERCLA [the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, commonly known as Superfund]”); 
CERCLA Overview, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/ce  
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all ex post. Public perception is also less important in fields where the 
law is intended to apply primarily to sophisticated actors with particular 
knowledge of the applicable law, such as for a plethora of regulatory 
law in fields as diverse as health law,75 securities law,76 
communications law,77 and environmental law.78 
The incentive structure of intellectual property law, on the other 
hand, can succeed only if it affects human perception and consequently 
human behavior ex ante. This study, therefore, embarks on a new line of 
research to investigate the potential for intellectual property law to have 
its desired effect, focusing first on general public perception. Public 
perception of intellectual property rights is expected to represent the 
perspectives, and therefore influence the actions of, many potential 
intellectual property creators, users, jurors and judges, and legislators. 
Each of these categories of actors is discussed in turn. 
First, public perception of intellectual property represents the 
perspective of a significant portion of potential intellectual property 
creators, and is expected to affect this population’s decisions concerning 
what activities they will engage in. While some potential intellectual 
property producers will have sophisticated knowledge of intellectual 
property law, a substantial pool of creators is expected to operate on the 
basis of general public understanding. This pool includes many 
individual creators, who generally do not have sophisticated knowledge 
of intellectual property law, but still make substantial contributions to 
valuable copyright and patent activity.79 This pool also includes many 
creators and decision makers at smaller companies, such as start-up 
                                                                                                                     
rcla.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2014). 
 75. E.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-60 (2006) (providing 
disclosure and commercialization requirements for pharmaceutical manufacturers). 
 76. E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881-909 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2006)); Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 
74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006)) (providing regulations for securities 
traders). 
 77. E.g., Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified 
throughout Title 47 of the U.S.C.) (providing a variety of disclosure and regulatory requirements 
for firms in the telecommunications industry). 
 78. E.g., Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 11001–11050 (2006) (requiring owners and operators of facilities using toxic chemicals to 
disclose certain information about the use); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2006) (governing the disposal of hazardous waste by hazardous waste 
generators); Summary of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-resource-conservation-
and-recovery-act (last visited Feb. 3, 2014). 
 79. See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 465–66 (2004) 
(reporting that a sample of 1,300 U.S. patents included 432 individual inventors and small entity 
owners); Raymond Shih Ray Ku et al., Does Copyright Law Promote Creativity? An Empirical 
Analysis of Copyright’s Bounty, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1669, 1711–12 (2009) (discussing a potential 
increase in size of the “creative class,” made up of individual artists and authors). 
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entities and small firms, where individuals generally lack significant 
expertise in intellectual property law.80 Professor Robert Merges, for 
example, has conducted an empirical survey of the professional creative 
landscape in copyright- and patent-intensive industries, and concludes 
that “[e]ighty-five percent of establishments in the arts, entertainment, 
and recreation industry employ fewer than [twenty] workers.”81 Merges 
concludes, “[R]esearch on innovation has in recent years consistently 
emphasized the increasing importance of smaller innovative companies” 
relative to larger companies.82 The prevalence of small entities in the 
creative industries and their relative contribution to innovation are 
critical, as research indicates that smaller firms are responsible for more 
significant innovation than larger firms.83 
Second, general public perception also characterizes the likely state 
of mind for most intellectual property users, many of whom are 
expected to operate with limited knowledge of intellectual property law. 
This is likely the state of understanding, with regard to intellectual 
property rights compliance and enforcement, for the dominant portion—
at least in numerosity—of the user population.84  
Third, public perception of intellectual property represents the 
expected mindset for most jurors and many judges tasked with deciding 
intellectual property cases. In the recent Apple Inc. v. Samsung 
Electronics Co. litigation, for example, it appears that the jury foreman, 
widely recognized to have led the jury deliberation and decision-
making, did not accurately understand patent law as explained through 
instruction by the court.85 In such circumstances, presumably common 
in jury deliberation, the public psychology of intellectual property likely 
represents the dominant understanding in individual and group decision-
making. Many district court judges also will not be specifically 
knowledgeable about intellectual property. Most district court judges 
hear copyright and patent cases so infrequently that they are not experts 
in intellectual property law.86 Public perception of intellectual property 
                                                                                                                     
 80. See Janis & Holbrook, supra note 2, at 84 (rejecting “the notion” that those who 
operate under the patent system are all sophisticated concerning the content of patent law). 
 81.  MERGES, supra note 45, at 204. 
 82. Id. at 204 fig.7.1, 210. 
 83. Id. at 210–12; Josh Lerner, The New New Financial Thing: The Origins of Financial 
Innovations, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 223, 224 (2006). 
 84. See Tyler, supra note 2, at 224 (suggesting, based on experimental research, that 
gaining voluntary cooperation with the law will increase the effectiveness of intellectual 
property law). 
 85. Mike Masnick, Samsung/Apple Jury Foreman’s Explanation for Verdict Shows He 
Doesn’t Understand Prior Art, TECHDIRT (Aug. 30, 2012), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120830/02063020214/samsungapple-jury-foremans-explana  
tion-verdict-shows-he-doesnt-understand-prior-art.shtml. 
 86. See THE STATISTICS DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF 
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rights is therefore likely the best indicator of the perspectives of most 
jurors and many judges. 
Fourth, the public psychology of intellectual property is also 
expected to influence and guide many lawmakers in determining their 
support for or opposition to particular intellectual property law 
proposals, such as SOPA and PIPA. This is true both on the individual 
preference level—i.e., it is the perception that many legislators are 
expected to possess as individuals—and also on the representative level 
because legislators will be affected by the opinions and public discourse 
surrounding intellectual property debates produced by the voting public, 
media, and general citizenry. These final effects bring the discussion 
full circle, as they indicate that the public psychology of intellectual 
property will guide even sophisticated intellectual property firms, which 
will recognize that they operate in an environment where legal decision-
making, public policy, and their consumers are all influenced by the 
public psychology of intellectual property rights. 
The public psychology of intellectual property is thus critical to the 
function of the intellectual property system.87 People with different 
perspectives on intellectual property law and rights are expected to 
behave differently. Despite this crucial import, the public perception of 
intellectual property rights has barely been explored. Understanding this 
psychology can clarify the likelihood that intellectual property law will 
achieve its objectives, the propensity for people to obey intellectual 
property law, how judges and juries will decide intellectual property 
cases, and the probability that particular intellectual property laws will 
be enacted. In an effort to shed light on the psychological and 
behavioral issues that underscore the intellectual property system, the 
study reported here is designed to examine popular conceptions of 
intellectual property rights and the basis for these rights, how these 
popular conceptions map onto actual law, and variation in perceptions 
between copyright and patent protection. The answers to these questions 
will provide significant insight concerning how people actually respond 
to the psychological and behavioral assumptions of the intellectual 
property system, and potentially how the law may be modified to better 
                                                                                                                     
THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 128–30 (2012), http://www. 
uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2011/JudicialBusiness2011.pdf (reporting that 
approximately 2% of district court judge caseloads involve copyright and patent cases). Congress 
recently enacted a pilot program that is investigating the potential benefits of funneling patent 
cases to judges who opt to hear more such cases. Press Release, Third Branch News: U.S. Courts, 
District Courts Selected for Patent Program (June 7, 2011), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/11-06-07/District_Courts_Selected_for_Patent_Pilot 
_Program.aspx. 
 87. See, e.g., MacCoun et al., supra note 5, at 347 (explaining that if people do not 
accurately understand marijuana prohibition laws, then such laws cannot have their designed 
effect with respect to deterrence). 
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serve society’s ends.88 
II.  EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
The current study utilizes a series of innovation scenarios to examine 
how popular conceptions of intellectual property rights comport with 
actual intellectual property law and how those popular conceptions vary 
across different types of creative endeavors. The study also investigates 
public perception of the basis for intellectual property rights. 
A.  Methodology 
Four different innovation scenarios were developed involving 
hypothetical factual situations designed to test public perceptions of 
intellectual property rights, both in areas where patent and copyright 
law are harmonious and where they diverge. Each scenario concerns a 
creator, the creator’s creative product, and the creator’s potential 
intellectual property rights in the creative product. Each scenario has 
two conditions. One condition involves artistic creativity, such as the 
production of a new book, song, or sculpture. The second condition is 
worded nearly identically, except that instead of involving an artistic 
creation, the creator works on and achieves an inventive creation, such 
as a medical device, mechanical invention, or computer program. 
Participants received one condition for each of the four innovation 
scenarios, randomly selected and ordered, though controlled so that 
each participant received two artistic creation and two inventive 
creation scenarios. 
Participants in each study condition were queried concerning 
whether they thought the creator should be entitled to intellectual 
property rights in the creative product, and answered by selecting a 
response on a seven-point scale ranging from “Definitely Not” to 
“Definitely Yes.” Follow-up questions regarding the participants’ basis 
for awarding or not awarding such rights were then asked.  These 
questions were answered on a multiple choice selection that included 
brief written descriptions of natural rights, incentive, and expressive 
bases for intellectual property law, as well as an option to provide 
another explanation. Participants were also queried on a variety of 
demographic information, and asked whether they had any personal 
experience with intellectual property law, such as working as an 
attorney, paralegal, creator, or otherwise.  
A national population of 1,719 United States adults took part in the 
                                                                                                                     
 88. See, e.g., Cardi et al., supra note 1, at 567 (presenting experimental evidence 
concerning how subjects responded to the threat of potential tort liability in an effort to better 
understand the influence of the tort law system on human behavior). 
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study, produced via SurveyMonkey, an online survey instrument 
company.89 The study participants were not paid for taking part in the 
survey, but they were entered into a weekly cash drawing and a 
donation was made to charity on their behalf for their participation. The 
study population was 47% female and ranged in age from eighteen to 
ninety-one, with an average age of forty-two. The study population was 
86% white, 5% African-American, 3% Asian, and 7% classified 
themselves as having another racial makeup. Examples of the 
innovation scenarios, in both copyright and patent conditions, are 
provided in Appendix A. 
B.  Results 
1.  Scenario One: Infringement 
The most fundamental right provided by intellectual property 
protection is the right to exclude others from copying copyrighted or 
patented work. A copyright generally protects its owner against another 
person copying, distributing, performing, or displaying the copyrighted 
work.90 A patent prohibits anyone else from making, using, selling, 
offering for sale, or importing the patented subject matter.91  
Scenario One tested participants’ opinions concerning infringement 
liability for copying the creative works of others. This scenario involved 
a software programmer in the invention/patent condition and a musician 
in the artistic/copyright condition. In each case, the creator had recently 
completed a new, nonobvious work. The creator placed the new 
computer program or song on a website, permitting others to use it, but 
included a notice specifically stating that no one should download or 
copy the work without the creator’s permission. A second party visited 
the website, downloaded the work without permission, and used it 
regularly. Participants were queried concerning whether they agreed or 
disagreed that the creator should be entitled to monetary damages for 
intellectual property rights infringement. 
The scenarios in Scenario One were drafted such that the computer 
program and the new song would be entitled to patent and copyright 
protection, respectively, under the law. Both scenario conditions 
constitute infringement by the second party under patent and copyright 
law, and would entitle the creator to monetary damages.92 
Seventy percent of respondents in the patent condition answered that 
                                                                                                                     
 89. See http://www.surveymonkey.com/ for information about SurveyMonkey. 
 90. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
 91. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006). 
 92. The copying party in the copyright scenario could raise a fair use defense to 
infringement, but the facts of the scenario make this argument weak. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 
(defining statutory provisions of fair use). 
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the computer program developer should be entitled to monetary 
damages, a response consistent with intellectual property law, versus 
19% who believed that the creator should not be so entitled. Fifty-nine 
percent of respondents in the copyright condition concluded that the 
songwriter was entitled to monetary damages, while 31% believed that 
the creator was not. Though this provides a majority response consistent 
with copyright law, it is a relatively weak majority, and a far smaller 
differential (28%) than the patent scenario (51%). Results are displayed 
in Figure 1.93 Two-tailed binomial tests reveal that participants were 
significantly more likely to conclude that the creator was entitled to 
damages than to conclude that the creator was not entitled to damages in 
both the patent (p < .001) and copyright (p < .001) scenarios. 
 
Figure 1. Infringement Scenario Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patent condition participant responses: No—155; Undecided—96; Yes—587. Copyright 
condition participant responses: No—273; Undecided—84; Yes—516. Figure 1 displays 
these responses as percentages.  The position of actual IP law is labeled with bullet 
points. 
Comparing the mean responses on the seven-point scale on 
entitlement to monetary damages using an independent samples t-test 
confirms that participants were significantly more likely to conclude 
that infringing the patented invention (M = 5.18, SD = 1.84), versus the 
artistic creation (M = 4.65, SD = 2.05), entitled the creator to damages 
(t(1701) = 5.62, p < .001).94 Respondents were more likely to award 
                                                                                                                     
 93. For ease of comparison, Figures 1–4 group the seven-point intellectual property rights 
responses into three categories: those who opposed intellectual property rights in a given 
scenario (individuals who responded “Definitely Not,” “Probably Not,” or “Perhaps Not” to the 
intellectual property rights query), those who were at the mid-point (“Maybe”), and those who 
were opposed to intellectual property rights in the scenario (“Definitely Yes,” “Probably Yes,” 
or “Perhaps Yes”).  
 94. Levene’s Test indicated unequal variances (F = 36.271, p = .000), so degrees of 
freedom were adjusted from 1709 to 1701. For background information on Levene’s Test, see 
Levene Test for Equality of Variances, NIST/SEMATECH E-HANDBOOK OF STATISTICAL 
METHODS, http://www.itl.nist.gov/div898/handbook/eda/section3/eda35a.htm (last visited Feb. 
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damages for infringement of an inventive creation than for infringement 
of an equivalent artistic creation. 
2.  Scenario Two: Creativity Threshold 
One area where copyright law and patent law diverge sharply is the 
requisite level of creativity for a work to obtain intellectual property 
protection. As discussed above, copyright protection is available for any 
work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium, so long as the work is 
original with the author.95 The threshold of originality for copyright 
protection is famously low, and does not require evaluation of how 
creative a work is, so long as it meets the de minimis originality 
standard.96 Patent law, on the other hand, has an elevated creativity 
threshold. To merit patent protection, an invention must be nonobvious 
in comparison to prior technology from the perspective of a person 
having ordinary skill in the field of endeavor.97 The rationale behind the 
nonobvious requirement in patent law is that obvious advances will be 
achieved without the necessity of a patent incentive, and that trivial 
advances do not benefit society enough to warrant imposing the costs of 
a patent monopoly on the public.98 
The second scenario investigated participants’ perceptions of the 
appropriate level of creative achievement necessary to entitle a creator 
to copyright or patent protection. The invention/patent condition 
involved a scientist who achieved a mechanical invention. As described 
in the scenario, though the invention is new, both its development and 
the actual inventive accomplishment are somewhat predictable, and 
would be considered obvious to a person with ordinary skill and 
experience in the inventor’s field. The artistic/copyright condition is 
worded essentially identically, except that the new work is a fictional 
book, rather than a mechanical invention. 
Scenario Two is drafted such that the creative achievements in each 
condition are new, but not highly creative. These circumstances would 
entitle a creator to copyright protection under copyright law’s 
originality standard, but would not entitle a creator to patent protection 
pursuant to patent law’s requirement that the invention be nonobvious. 
Contrary to intellectual property law, 60% of respondents in the 
patent condition concluded that the inventor was entitled to intellectual 
property protection. Consistent with the law, 75% of respondents in the 
copyright condition similarly concluded that the author was entitled to 
intellectual property protection. Two-tailed binomial tests demonstrate 
                                                                                                                     
3, 2014). 
 95. 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
 96. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 97. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419–20 (2007). 
 98. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8–10 (1966). 
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that participants were significantly more likely to grant intellectual 
property protection to a novel, obvious creation than to deny protection 
in both the patent (p < .001) and copyright (p < .001) scenarios. 
 
Figure 2. Creativity Threshold Scenario Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patent condition participant responses: No—218; Undecided—115; Yes—500. Copyright 
condition participant responses: No—136; Undecided—85; Yes—648.  Figure 2 displays 
these responses as percentages. The position of actual IP law is labeled with bullet points.  
An independent samples t-test of the responses found that 
respondents were significantly more likely to award intellectual 
property protection for an artistic creation (M = 5.44, SD = 1.77) than 
for an equally creative inventive work (M = 4.72, SD = 1.85, 
t(1687) = 8.19, p < .001).99 Participants tended to prefer a higher 
creativity threshold for acquiring intellectual property rights to an 
inventive work than for an artistic creation, though not as high a 
standard in the former case as is dictated by actual patent law.  
3.  Scenario Three: Independent Creators 
Copyright law and patent law also differ concerning the potential 
intellectual property rights of later, independent creators. Copyright 
doctrine provides that a subsequent author who independently produces 
a work that is similar to an earlier copyrighted work is entitled to a 
separate copyright in the later work and is not liable for copyright 
infringement for publishing or distributing the independent work.100 
Under copyright law, it is the work itself that is copyrighted, and 
protection only applies to copying of that particular work.101 A patent 
provides very different protection. A patent protects an area of subject 
matter from infringement, not just a particular invention.102 Thus, a 
                                                                                                                     
 99. Levene’s Test indicated unequal variances (F = 7.120, p = .008), so degrees of 
freedom were adjusted from 1700 to 1687. 
 100. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2010); Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 345. 
 101. 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
 102. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2010); Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 805 F.2d 
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patent covers not only an innovator’s particular embodiment of an 
invention, but also an area of technology surrounding the invention, as 
defined by the patent’s descriptive claims.103 A subsequent inventor 
cannot practice any invention that falls within the scope of the patented 
subject matter, regardless of whether the later invention was 
independently achieved.104 A copyright owner must prove copying in 
order to establish infringement liability,105 while a patent owner does 
not.106 
The third scenario concerned independent creators. In the 
artistic/copyright condition, a sculptor, after considerable effort, 
produced a new sculpture. Shortly thereafter, a second sculptor, who 
lived across the country and was entirely unaware of and not influenced 
by the first sculptor or the first sculptor’s work, produced a substantially 
similar sculpture. The invention/patent condition is identical, except that 
it concerns a doctor’s invention of a new medical device.  
In each condition, the study participants were informed that the first 
creator was entitled to intellectual property rights in the initial sculpture 
or medical device. The participants were queried concerning whether 
the second creator should also be entitled to his or her own intellectual 
property rights. As explained above, under intellectual property law, the 
second sculptor would be entitled to an independent copyright in his or 
her sculpture under copyright law, while patent law would bar the 
second inventor from patenting the later medical invention in the 
corresponding patent scenario. 
Consistent with copyright law, 60% of participants in the copyright 
condition concluded that the later, independent sculptor should be 
entitled to separate intellectual property rights in the second sculpture. 
Contrary to patent law, 55% of participants in the patent condition 
concluded that the later, independent inventor should be entitled to 
separate intellectual property rights in the second medical device. Two-
tailed binomial tests indicate that participants were significantly more 
likely to award the later independent creator intellectual property rights 
than to deny rights in both the patent (p < .001) and copyright (p < .001) 
scenarios. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
1558, 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 103. 35 U.S.C. § 112; Tex. Instruments, 805 F.2d at 1562–63. 
 104. 35 U.S.C. § 102; Scanner Techs. Corp. v. ICOS Vision Sys. Corp., 528 F.3d 1365, 
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 105.  Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 361. 
 106. See Scanner Techs., 528 F.3d at 1379 (“[Patent infringement] claims can be met by 
slavish copying, or equally met by independent development of the accused products.”). 
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Figure 3. Independent Creator Scenario Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patent condition participant responses: No—282; Undecided—114; Yes—476. Copyright 
condition participant responses: No—242; Undecided—89; Yes—501. Figure 3 displays 
these responses as percentages.  The position of actual IP law is labeled with bullet 
points.  
The mean values of the copyright (M = 4.69, SD = 2.17) and patent 
(M = 4.53, SD = 2.09) condition responses were not significantly 
different under an independent samples t-test (t(1702) = 1.60, p > .1). 
Thus, the study participants treated the invention and artistic scenarios 
similarly, in both cases tending to prefer awarding intellectual property 
protection to a later independent creator in addition to the rights held by 
the first creator. 
4.  Scenario Four: Joint Creators 
Copyright and patent laws further differ in the requirements for, and 
rights of, joint creators. Joint creator law pertains to whether an 
individual, such as a collaborator, assistant, or supervisor, has 
contributed enough to an endeavor to be entitled to the status of joint 
author or joint inventor, and is consequently entitled to concomitant 
copyright or patent rights in the underlying intellectual property. 
Copyright law provides that individuals are only joint authors if each 
contributor intends to produce a joint work, each contributor intends to 
be a joint author, and each contributor makes an independently 
copyrightable contribution to the work.107 Patent law is more lenient in 
this regard. Individuals are joint inventors if they make a not 
insignificant contribution to the conception of an invention, regardless 
of intent, even if they did not make an independently patentable 
contribution, and even if they only contributed to a subset of the patent 
claims.108 Joint owners of intellectual property are, under both copyright 
and patent law, typically treated as tenants in common in their 
intellectual property rights, meaning that the joint owners possess equal 
                                                                                                                     
 107. Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1233–35 (9th Cir. 2000); Thomson v. Larson, 
147 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 108. Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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rights to produce, distribute, and license the intellectual property.109 
The stark difference between joint author versus joint inventor 
doctrine is evident in the case law. In a seminal copyright case, the court 
held that a dramaturg who had contributed independently copyrightable 
material, which constituted one-sixth of the Pulitzer Prize and Tony 
Award-winning musical Rent, was not entitled to be a joint author 
because the lead author had not intended such.110 In the leading joint 
inventor case, on the other hand, the court held that an electronics 
technician who contributed to two claims out of dozens in a medical 
device invention, neither of which were even involved in the 
infringement at issue, was entitled to equal ownership of the entire 
patent, regardless of the lead inventor’s intent.111 
Scenario Four concerned whether a party that provides assistance to 
a primary creator should be entitled to share intellectual property rights 
in the final work. The artistic/copyright condition concerned a 
songwriter who recently completed an initial version of a new song. The 
author of the song contacted a second songwriter, whom the author had 
heard about but had never worked with before, for feedback on the 
song. The initial author was particularly concerned with one section of 
the song that the author felt was not as strong as it could be. The second 
songwriter provided feedback to the original author, including on the 
particular portion of the song identified. The original author 
incorporated some of the second songwriter’s suggestions into the final 
song. In total, the second songwriter’s feedback was responsible for 
about 20% of the final song. 
Study participants were informed that the original songwriter was 
entitled to intellectual property rights in the final song, and were queried 
concerning whether the secondary contributor should be entitled to 
share in those intellectual property rights. The participants were 
informed of some of the rights that joint ownership would provide under 
intellectual property law, but were not informed about the legal standard 
for becoming a joint owner. The invention/patent condition was 
identical, except that the creative subject matter was a new software 
program, not a new song. 
Participants in both the patent and copyright conditions were 
relatively evenly split concerning whether intellectual property rights 
should be awarded to the secondary contributor, as shown in Figure 4. 
Two-tailed binomial tests revealed that participants were significantly 
less likely to grant a share of intellectual property rights to a secondary 
contributor in the copyright context (p < .05), but not in the patent 
context (p > .05). 
                                                                                                                     
 109. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006); 35 U.S.C. §§ 116, 262 (2006). 
 110. Thompson, 147 F.3d at 200–05. 
 111. Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460–64. 
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Figure 4. Joint Creator Scenario Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patent condition participant responses:  No—365; Undecided—127; Yes—379.  
Copyright condition participant responses: No—395; Undecided—112; Yes—330.  
Figure 4 displays these responses as percentages.  The position of actual IP law is labeled 
with bullet points. 
Participants in the patent condition were slightly more likely to 
conclude that the second creator was entitled to joint creator rights 
(M = 3.97, SD = 1.95) than participants in the copyright condition 
(M = 3.74, SD = 1.95) according to an independent samples t-test 
(t(1706) = 2.45, p = .015).  
These results are modestly consistent with joint creator law, to the 
extent joint inventorship presents a lower hurdle to ownership than joint 
authorship. The magnitude of the difference in the study results, 
however, appears significantly less than would be expected considering 
the actual differences in legal doctrine, and the results indicate that 
public perceptions are likely stricter for inventors than actual patent law 
and looser for authors than actual copyright doctrine. 
5.  Basis for Intellectual Property Rights 
All four scenarios also examined public perception concerning the 
basis for intellectual property rights. After participants answered the 
initial intellectual property rights questions for their two patent and two 
copyright scenarios, participants were queried concerning the basis for 
awarding or denying intellectual property rights in the final scenario 
considered. The intellectual property basis question was asked at the 
end of the scenarios so as not to bias answers to the individual scenario 
conditions. Each participant thus answered the question on the basis for 
intellectual property rights in only the last of the four scenario 
conditions received. The scenarios and conditions were ordered 
randomly so that approximately one-eighth of the full study population 
answered the intellectual property rights basis question for each of the 
four scenarios in the two different conditions. 
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The response options for the intellectual property basis question 
were modeled on the three most commonly propounded bases for 
intellectual property law, as discussed above: a natural rights basis, an 
incentive basis, and an expressive basis. The basis question queried 
respondents concerning whether the basis for their decision on 
intellectual property rights was (1) the best way to give people who 
accomplish something creative the intellectual property rights to which 
they are entitled; (2) the best way for intellectual property rights to 
encourage people to pursue creative accomplishments; (3) the best way 
for intellectual property rights to support the opportunity for people to 
express themselves creatively; or (4) some other explanation (with 
space provided for an open-ended answer by the respondent). Overall, 
respondents were substantially more likely to identify a natural rights 
entitlement basis for intellectual property rights (60%) than either an 
incentive (23%) or expressive (17%) basis.112 These results run strongly 
contrary to the dominant theory of intellectual property law recognized 
in most intellectual property policy, economic, and legal analysis.113 
Figure 5 presents the percentage of participants selecting each of the 
identified bases for intellectual property rights, differentiated by 
scenario and condition. In every condition and every scenario, more 
participants perceived a natural rights foundation to intellectual property 
rights than any alternative basis, generally by a wide margin. Two-tailed 
binomial tests reveal that participants were significantly more likely to 
select a natural rights basis for intellectual property rights over either of 
the other bases in each of the conditions and scenarios (p < .001 for 
each case), except for the patent condition creativity threshold scenario, 
in which there was no significant difference between the entitlement 
and incentive responses (p > .05).114 In the public mind, intellectual 
property law exists to endow creators with natural rights to their 
intellectual creations, not to provide an incentive for creative activity in 
the first instance. 
                                                                                                                     
 112. The reported results exclude participants who selected “Another explanation” from the 
percentage statistics. 
 113. See supra Section I.B. 
 114. In the patent condition creativity threshold scenario, participants preferred both the 
natural rights and incentive bases over the expressive basis (p < .001). 
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Figure 5. Basis for Intellectual Property Rights 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking beyond the dominance of the natural rights basis, 
respondents were generally more likely to identify incentives as the 
basis for intellectual property rights in the patent conditions than in the 
copyright conditions. In Scenarios One and Two, twice as many 
participants selected an incentive basis in the patent condition, a 
difference that was narrower in Scenario Three and absent in Scenario 
Four. Note that Scenarios One and Two involved questions about the 
absolute existence of intellectual property rights (or not), while 
Scenarios Three and Four concerned how to potentially divide 
intellectual property rights among multiple creators. 
Respondents were about twice as likely to identify an expressive 
basis for intellectual property rights for artistic as opposed to inventive 
creativity. While 17% to 26% of copyright condition respondents 
selected the expressive value as the basis for intellectual property rights 
across the four scenarios, only 11% to 13% of patent condition 
respondents reached the same conclusion in the scenarios. 
That participant responses vary across the eight conditions reported 
here indicates that participants’ views on the basis for intellectual 
property rights are contextual, depending on the particular factual 
scenarios and types of rights involved. In particular, despite an overall 
natural rights orientation, the results indicate that respondents appear to 
view the basis of copyright law slightly differently than the basis for 
patent law. 
Entitled Basis                          Incentive Basis                  Expressive Basis 
Study 1:  Infringement Scenario Study 2:  Creativity Threshold Scenario 
Study 3:  Independent Creator Scenario Study 4:  Joint Creator Scenario 
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6.  Preferences for the Strength of Intellectual Property Rights 
The infringement and creativity threshold scenarios, as noted above, 
concern decisions about whether to award any intellectual property 
rights in a creative work or none at all. The responses to these scenarios 
therefore give an indication of whether an individual supports stronger 
or weaker intellectual property protection. Responses to these two 
scenarios were averaged for each respondent to produce an “IP 
Strength” variable, providing a Likert scale to indicate whether any 
particular participant tended to generally prefer stronger versus weaker 
intellectual property rights. The mean IP Strength rating across all study 
participants was 4.99 on the seven-point scale. 
There was a significant relationship between participants’ responses 
concerning the basis for intellectual property rights and their IP Strength 
ratings. Respondents who perceived a natural rights basis for 
intellectual property had significantly higher IP Strength scores 
(M = 5.27, SD = 1.36) than those who supported an incentive basis 
(M = 4.73, SD = 1.32, t(1041) = 5.80, p < .001) or those who supported 
an expressive basis (M = 4.69, SD = 1.38, t(953) = 5.35, p < .001), each 
pursuant to independent samples t-tests. Those who perceived an 
expressive basis for intellectual property rights did not differ 
significantly from those who perceived an incentive basis 
(t(500) = 0.30, p > .05). 
Linear regression analysis was used to examine the relationship 
between IP Strength and a number of independent variables. The 
independent variables included gender (female=0; male=1), race 
(white=0; minority/non-white=1), age, political ideology (based on 
responses to a seven-point scale query running from Extremely 
Liberal=1 to Extremely Conservative=7), income (respondent’s annual 
income, grouped in five ranges), education (number of years of school), 
and past experience with intellectual property law. Past experience with 
intellectual property law considered in the survey included work as an 
intellectual property attorney or paralegal, being the creator of patented 
or copyrighted work,115 or any other self-identified experience in the 
field. 
The regression model is statistically significant overall 
(F7,1256 = 4.011, R2 = .022, p < .001). Being older, having lower income, 
                                                                                                                     
 115. Doctrinally, everyone is the creator of copyrighted work (from the time one first 
draws as a child), as copyright protection attaches automatically as soon as original work of 
authorship is fixed in a tangible medium. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). The intellectual property 
experience question was administered based on the reasoning that primarily individuals who 
depended to some significant extent on copyright protection for their work or as a hobby would 
self-identify as having created copyrighted work. Consistent with this reasoning, only 80 (4.7%) 
of the 1,719 person subject pool indicated that they had created copyrighted work. 
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being more educated, and having less intellectual property experience 
all correlate with a desire for stronger intellectual property protection 
across the scenarios. Results are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.  IP Strength and Predictor Variables Regression 
 
 β coefficient
Gender -.017
Race .025
Age .100**
Political Ideology .034
Income -.071*
Education .065*
IP Experience -.059*
* Result is significant at the .05 level. ** Result is significant at the .01 level. 
 
Because the predictor variables could affect preferences related to 
artistic versus technological creation in different manners, separate 
regressions were run after segregating the cases into the patent and 
copyright conditions for the two scenarios used to produce the IP 
Strength scale. Both the patent condition (F6,624 = 4.564, R2 = .042, 
p < .001) and the copyright condition (F6,626 = 2.238, R2 = .021, p < .05) 
produced statistically significant models. Results are shown in Table 
2.116  
 
Table 2.  IP Strength in Patent and Copyright Conditions 
 
 Patent Condition
β coefficient
Copyright Condition 
β coefficient 
Gender -.078 .039
Race .049 .011
Age .132** .059
Political Ideology .113** -.041
Income -.079* -.067
Education .000 .101*
* Result is significant at the .05 level. ** Result is significant at the .01 level. 
 
Different predictor variables explained the variation in the patent 
versus copyright conditions. Though being older and having lower 
income both correlated with a desire for stronger patent protection, 
neither correlated with copyright protection responses. Conversely, 
                                                                                                                     
 116. The intellectual property experience variable was removed from these regressions to 
consider it in further detail below. 
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being more educated correlated with a desire for stronger copyright 
protection, but not with patent preferences. Being more conservative 
also correlates with a preference for stronger patent protection, a 
relationship that does not exist for the overall or the copyright 
populations. 
Finally, because beliefs concerning the basis for intellectual property 
rights could affect preferences for the strength of intellectual property 
rights in different ways, regressions were run dividing the patent and 
copyright condition groups by their perceptions of the basis for 
intellectual property rights. Two models were significant overall: the 
model for patent condition respondents who believe in natural rights to 
intellectual property protection (F6,267 = 4.178, R2 = .086, p < .001) and 
copyright condition respondents who believe in an expressive basis for 
intellectual property protection (F6,70 = 2.276, R2 = .163, p < .05). 
Results are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.  IP Strength and Basis for IP Protection 
 
 Patent Condition
Natural Rights IP Basis 
β coefficient
Copyright Condition 
Expressive IP Basis 
β coefficient 
Gender -.123* .156 
Race .036 .279* 
Age .215** .183 
Political Ideology .128* .187 
Income -.100 -.192 
Education .015 .000 
* Result is significant at the .05 level. ** Result is significant at the .01 level. 
 
Two relationships not identified in the earlier regressions emerge 
here. First, women tended to prefer stronger patent rights than men 
among those respondents who believe in a natural rights basis for 
intellectual property rights. Second, minorities tended to prefer stronger 
copyright protection than whites among those respondents who believe 
in an expressive basis for intellectual property rights.117 
                                                                                                                     
 117. This analysis compares the 86% of survey respondents who self-identified as white 
with the combined 14% of survey respondents who self-identified as African-American, Asian, 
or having another racial makeup. It does not take into account responses to a separate question 
concerning whether the respondent self-identified as Hispanic. Further studies would be 
necessary to explore heterogeneity in intellectual property preferences within the minority/non-
white populations. 
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III.  DISCUSSION 
The innovation scenario experiments reveal that public perceptions 
concerning both the substance of and basis for intellectual property 
rights differ substantially from actual intellectual property law. 
Consequently, the behavioral policy on which intellectual property law 
is based may not function in the manner intended.118 This disconnect 
between public understanding and legal rules may weaken public 
perception of the legitimacy of the intellectual property system and 
undermine its ability to achieve the desired goals. This Section 
discusses implications of the study results for intellectual property law 
and for ongoing intellectual property policy debates. 
A.  Public Perception of Intellectual Property Rights and the Law 
Public perception concerning what copyright protection should be 
was partially consistent with actual copyright law. Across the 
infringement, creativity threshold, and independent creator scenarios, 
the majority of study participant responses concerning intellectual 
property rights were similar to what copyright law would dictate in each 
scenario. That said, in the last two of these three scenarios, the majority 
was relatively modest; in neither case did more than 60% of respondents 
agree with copyright law. The fourth scenario, concerning joint creator 
rights, presented more ambiguous results. Participants appeared more 
willing to grant a secondary contributor a share of intellectual property 
rights than actual copyright doctrine requires.119 Taken as a whole, a 
modest majority of the study population tended to agree with copyright 
law across the scenarios. 
The patent law scenario results present an even more disparate 
contrast between public perception and the law. Participant responses to 
the innovation scenarios diverged significantly from patent doctrine, 
                                                                                                                     
 118. In an attempt to better understand human behavioral response to the patent system, 
Professors Andrew Torrance and Bill Tomlinson developed an online computer game to 
simulate invention, patenting, and licensing. Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Patents 
and the Regress of Useful Arts, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 130, 134 (2009). Though the 
experiment involved a highly abstract model of the invention and patenting process, 
participants’ behavior varied between the patent, commons, and mixed patent/open source 
conditions. See id. at 166-67.  
 119. Overall, the results of the copyright scenarios appear perhaps contrary to conclusions 
reached in prior qualitative studies that lay individuals are “largely ignorant” of copyright law’s 
rights and responsibilities. E.g., John Palfrey et al., Youth, Creativity, and Copyright in the 
Digital Age, 1 INT’L J. LEARNING & MEDIA 79, 79–80 (2009) (concluding, based on a 
qualitative study, that youths are generally ignorant of copyright law). Although the instant 
study did not test participants’ knowledge of intellectual property law, the consistency between 
participant responses and the law could be interpreted to indicate that respondents would also 
answer with some accuracy if queried about actual law. These issues merit further investigation. 
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and differed in an inconsistent manner. Only 26% of study respondents 
in the creativity threshold scenario agreed with the patent law 
requirement that an invention must be nonobvious in order to deserve a 
patent; the majority instead would grant patent protection to an obvious 
mechanical invention. Similarly, though patent law prohibits a later 
independent inventor from obtaining patent protection on the same 
subject matter as an earlier inventor, a majority of respondents 
concluded that such an independent creator should receive intellectual 
property protection. The joint creator scenario results were also 
inconsistent with patent law; only a minority of respondents believed 
that a joint inventor deserved to share intellectual property rights in 
circumstances in which patent law would tend to award equal patent 
rights. The one scenario where public perception appeared consistent 
with actual law was the base infringement scenario, where a strong 
majority of participants reached a conclusion of infringement, consistent 
with patent doctrine. 
The variation between public perception and intellectual property 
law did not display a consistent directional bias. Across the four 
scenarios, in both the copyright and patent conditions, participants 
sometimes preferred stronger, sometimes weaker, and sometimes 
similar intellectual property protection to actual law. This mix of 
relations has important implications for the intellectual property system. 
Inaccurate perceptions that are too strong or too weak do not have 
symmetric effects on incentives for potential intellectual property 
creators. If incentives to create are perceived as weaker than actual law, 
such misperception is expected to lead to the underinvestment of 
resources in creative activity, and consequently to less intellectual 
creation and commercialization than is socially optimal. If incentives 
are perceived as greater than actual law, however, such misperception is 
expected to lead to the overinvestment of resources in creative activity. 
Though the overinvestment of resources has a social cost because it is 
not the most efficient deployment of such resources, the extra creative 
innovation that is achieved is still socially beneficial: society gets the 
benefit of this additional creation that results from the private 
misallocation of resources due to misperceived excess incentives. This 
analysis reveals that (1) there is likely a greater social cost to public 
misperception that intellectual property protection is weaker than actual 
law versus misperception that protection is stronger than the law, and 
(2) public perception that intellectual property protection is stronger in 
some areas than actual law, and weaker in others, does not simply 
balance itself out to produce accurate behavioral incentives overall. 
Returning to the study results, why would lay perceptions of 
intellectual property rights be partially consistent with copyright law, 
but relatively disharmonious with patent doctrine? There are several 
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possible explanations for this divergence, depending in part on the 
causal relationship between these findings. The nature of the study does 
not permit identifying the existence or direction of any causal 
interaction between public perception and the law. That is, the 
correlation found in the study does not demonstrate whether public 
perceptions influence the law, whether intellectual property law 
influences public perceptions, or whether some third factor influences 
both public perception and the law.120 
It is possible, for example, that a greater portion of the public is 
aware of actual copyright law than patent law, and that knowledge of 
what the law actually is influences perceptions of what the law should 
be.121 This could occur because most members of the public interact 
with copyright law more regularly than with patent law, and may have 
derived greater knowledge of copyright law from this experience. For 
example, members of the public now have routine interaction with 
copyright law through copyright warnings on DVDs and streaming 
movies, shrink-wrap licenses, recording industry advertisements against 
copying, and a plethora of uses on the Internet. This type of interaction 
is much rarer with respect to patent protection.122 
It is also possible that a causal relationship operates in precisely the 
opposite direction, with public preferences having a greater influence on 
copyright law than on patent doctrine. Lay lawmakers may perceive that 
they have a greater understanding of the underlying subject matter of 
copyright law, due to their greater interaction with the law as noted 
above and the nontechnical accessibility of copyrighted works. Such 
lawmakers may consequently feel comfortable and interested in taking a 
greater role in drafting and shaping copyright law. Broad public 
perception could drive copyright law in other manners as well, as was 
demonstrated in the SOPA and PIPA debates.123 As a result, public 
perceptions may have a greater influence on copyright law, via 
lawmakers and the general public, than they do on patent law, the 
subject matter of which is often viewed as more technical and obscure. 
Patent law drafting may, therefore, be left to “experts” to a greater 
                                                                                                                     
 120. See Friedman, supra note 11, at 294 (discussing the unclear causal relationship 
between psychology and law where popular conceptions of ownership and property law 
coincide). 
 121. See Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 
37 (2002) (discussing how the law can affect social norms and individual preferences); see, e.g., 
Nora M. Findlay, In-School Administrators’ Knowledge of Education Law, 17 EDUC. & L.J. 177, 
188 (2007) (suggesting that greater awareness of constitutional rights in a particular context 
resulted in increased sensitivity towards such rights). 
 122. But see Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 
41 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1194–95 (1994) (examining the psychological limitations of the 
effectiveness of product warnings in the tort context). 
 123. See supra Section I.C. 
34
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 [], Art. 5
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss1/5
2014] THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 295 
 
extent. This has been the case historically for patent legislation. 
Drafting the Patent Act in 1952, the most substantial changes to 
statutory patent law within the last century, was famously assigned to a 
small committee of experts, and adopted by Congress without much 
debate.124 
Whatever the causal relationship between public perception and the 
law, the results of this study indicate that the dominant behavioral 
theory of intellectual property law may not be able to function as 
conceived.125 Given the public’s general lack of knowledge about 
intellectual property law,126 public perception of what the law should be 
and of the basis for the law are expected to provide the dominant source 
for human behavioral response to the intellectual property system.127 
Authors that misunderstand their potential to obtain copyright 
protection, or to shield a copyrighted work from infringement, will 
make inefficient decisions under the law concerning their efforts to 
engage in creative endeavors and distribute creative work. Similarly, a 
potential inventor who misperceives the likelihood of obtaining patent 
protection, or the scope and extent of patent rights, will also engage in 
an inefficient level of innovative and commercializing behavior relative 
to the law.128 Intellectual property users will fail to comply with 
                                                                                                                     
 124. Giles S. Rich, Congressional Intent—Or, Who Wrote the Patent Act of 1952?, in 
NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 35, 1:1, 1:10–1:13; P.J. Federico, Origins of Section 103, in 
NONOBVIOUSNESS, supra note 35, 1:101, 1:101–1.109. 
 125. See Cardi, supra note 1, at 591–92 (reporting experimental study of tort law 
indicating that the widely accepted behavioral model of potential tort liability as deterring 
behavior appears unsupported); MacCoun et al., supra note 5, at 347 (recognizing that if public 
perception diverges from the laws concerning marijuana possession, then the prohibition laws 
cannot have their desired effect).  
 126. See, e.g., Michael A. Gollin, Answering the Call: Public Interest Intellectual Property 
Advisors, 17 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 187, 213 (2005) (noting general lack of awareness about 
intellectual property law in developing countries); Palfrey et al., supra note 119, at 79 (finding 
that youths are generally ignorant of copyright law); see also Chris Hoofnagle et al., How 
Different are Young Adults from Older Adults When It Comes to Information Privacy 
Attitudes and Policies, FED. TRADE COMMISSION 1, 4 (Apr. 14, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1589864 (reporting survey results, in FTC-
hosted public roundtable, that indicate a general lack of awareness of privacy law among 
adults); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Science 
Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 174 (2004) (finding that people are largely 
ignorant of criminal law). 
 127. See Janis & Holbrook, supra note 2, at 78 (discussing how even if parties are unaware 
of the actual content of law, other mechanisms, such as background knowledge and norms, can 
provide indirect information about the law); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of 
Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 457 (1997) (explaining that people may comply with the law 
because they know the law, because the law may reflect widely shared beliefs, or because 
people may be concerned with how their social group will perceive them). 
 128. This is not to say that the disconnect between public perception and the law fully 
thwarts the law’s ability to provide incentives, only that the disconnect will prevent the law from 
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intellectual property law, even in situations where they intend to do so, 
leading to a reduction in intellectual property compliance and a likely 
increase in enforcement costs. Jurors, as indicated in the Apple v. 
Samsung case discussed earlier,129 and potentially judges and 
legislators, may make inappropriate decisions concerning the 
development and implementation of intellectual property law. 
Because this study concerns lay perceptions of intellectual property 
law, the results should not be interpreted to indicate that all individuals 
acting under the intellectual property system suffer the same 
misperceptions. While the results likely reflect the perspectives of most 
intellectual property users, jurors, and voters and citizens, they 
presumably represent the views of only a smaller portion of legislators, 
judges, and potential intellectual property creators. Some legislators and 
judges are certainly more educated concerning the scope and basis of 
intellectual property law. In particular, a recent pilot program that 
directs patent cases to particular district court judges in certain districts 
will make some district court judges greater experts in intellectual 
property law.130 Even sophisticated legislators and policymakers, 
however, will need to take public perceptions, whether accurate or not, 
into account in designing the intellectual property system in order to 
achieve the desired ends. 
Similarly, there are also many potential intellectual property 
producers and investors, particularly at large, sophisticated firms, who 
are more familiar with intellectual property law than the average 
member of the public. For such producers, including individuals who 
may lack personal knowledge of intellectual property law but are 
employed in a firm designed to take advantage of the provisions of the 
law, the intellectual property system may come closer to inducing the 
desired behavioral response than the results of the present study 
indicate—or, to be more precise, the present study does not disprove 
such a possibility. For many other potential intellectual property 
producers, however, the information on general public perception 
revealed here likely represents an accurate description of their 
                                                                                                                     
providing the full incentives that it is designed to achieve. As discussed below, some actors 
under the intellectual property system will operate in a more sophisticated intellectual property 
environment, and some members of the population will perceive a more accurate set of 
intellectual property laws and agree with the bases for the law, as shown by the results in 
Figures 1–5. 
 129. See supra Section I.D. 
 130. See Patent Cases Pilot Program, Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat. 3674 (2011); Press 
Release, Third Branch News: U.S. Courts, District Courts Selected for Patent Program (June 7, 
2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/11-06-07/District_Courts_Selected_for_
Patent_Pilot_Program.aspx (“Fourteen federal district courts have been selected to participate in 
a 10-year pilot project designed to enhance expertise in patent cases among U.S. district 
judges.”). 
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understanding of the intellectual property system. As described above, 
this latter group will include many individual producers and many 
producers working at start-up firms and small companies.131 These 
actors represent a significant portion of intellectual property producers, 
and they represent that portion that tends to provide the most significant 
advances.132 
While it is currently impossible to know how much creative behavior 
and attempted intellectual property compliance is misdirected as a result 
of the disconnect between public perception and intellectual property 
law, the results of this study indicate that there are likely problematic 
effects that merit attention. 
B.  Public Perception of Artistic Versus Inventive Creativity 
Respondents provided statistically significant different responses 
across the patent versus copyright conditions in three of the four 
scenarios. There was no apparent consistency, however, in the manner 
of difference. Whereas respondents perceived that patent rights should 
be stronger than copyright protection in the infringement scenario, they 
concurrently thought that copyright protection should be stronger than 
patent protection in the creativity threshold scenario. 
In the two scenarios that involved potentially dividing intellectual 
property rights across multiple creators or contributors, respondents 
were also split. In the joint creator rights scenario, respondents were 
more likely to support joint patent rights than joint copyright rights, in 
each case in comparison with awarding rights to a single creator. In the 
independent creator scenario, in contrast, there was no statistically 
significant difference between the patent and copyright conditions.  
Respondents also differed in their identified basis for intellectual 
property rights in the copyright versus patent conditions. Participants 
did favor a natural rights basis in every scenario, but tended to prefer an 
incentive to an expressive basis in the patent conditions and the opposite 
relationship in the copyright conditions. Members of the public appear 
to view artistic creativity somewhat differently than inventive creativity, 
and appear to have varying perceptions concerning what level of 
intellectual property protection is appropriate based upon the underlying 
creative work. Understanding the contours of such differentiation 
requires further study.133 
                                                                                                                     
 131. See supra Section I.D. 
 132. MERGES, supra note 45, at 204 fig.7.1, 210–12; Allison et al., supra note 79, at 467; 
Lerner, supra note 83, at 224. 
 133. One complicating factor with the current results is that differences in participants’ 
responses across conditions could be due either to differences in perception between artistic and 
inventive creativity or to different attitudes towards the protection of particular types of works. 
Stated another way, people could have different beliefs concerning the intellectual property 
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Although it is true that generally there was a statistically significant 
difference between the copyright and patent condition responses, the 
more striking result here may be the similarity of responses across 
conditions. Because of the large study population, even a small 
variation in responses will produce statistically different results. In 
comparison to actual law, however, there is actually relatively little 
variation across the copyright and patent conditions. For example, the 
largest variance across conditions was for the creativity threshold 
scenario, where 75% of copyright respondents would grant protection to 
obvious artistic creation, but only 60% of patent condition respondents 
would grant protection to obvious technological creation—a difference 
of 15%. But if participants had answered according to actual intellectual 
property law, 100% of copyright respondents versus 0% of patent 
respondents would grant protection.134 Even greater harmonization is 
revealed in the independent creators scenario, where the law again 
would dictate a 100% variation between copyright and patent 
doctrine,135 but participant responses varied by only 5% (60% of 
copyright participants versus 55% of patent participants would grant 
protection). The other two scenarios produced variations of 11% 
(infringement scenario) and 5% (joint creator scenario). 
Despite substantial variation in the copyright and patent systems, 
public perception of intellectual property rights across artistic versus 
technological domains is markedly similar. As with the earlier 
discussion concerning variance between public perception and law, the 
causal relationships underlying this correlation are intriguing and 
worthy of further study. It is possible that, for reasons discussed above, 
the general public is more familiar with, or has had greater influence on, 
copyright protection,136 and assumes a similar level of protection for 
patent law as well. Alternatively, it is also possible that the public’s 
general preferences for intellectual property protection happen to align 
more closely with copyright doctrine. The bottom line is that most 
members of the public appear to view copyright and patent law much 
more cohesively than the doctrine provides, and tend not to agree with 
the stark variation across these fields defined by intellectual property 
law. 
                                                                                                                     
protection of medical versus mechanical devices—both requiring inventive creativity—or 
between the protection of novels versus songs—both requiring artistic creativity. Distinguishing 
between attitudes across different types of creativity versus different creative domains would 
require investigating the same issues while varying the domains. 
 134. See supra Subsection II.B.2. 
 135. See supra Subsection II.B.3. 
 136. See supra Section III.A.  
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C.  The Basis for Intellectual Property Rights 
Given the widespread misunderstanding of intellectual property law 
among the public, the public perception of the basis for intellectual 
property rights is critically important as a determinant of human 
behavior concerning creative endeavors. Even if people do not know 
what intellectual property law is, they may still engage in behavior 
consistent with the objectives of the intellectual property system. If the 
public perception is in accord with the standard legal and policy basis 
for intellectual property law, then people may make inferences about 
intellectual property rights that are consistent with the law, and 
consequently act in a behavioral manner consistent with the law’s 
objectives.137 
Popular opinion concerning the basis for intellectual property rights, 
however, is largely out of step with expert opinion in intellectual 
property law and policy. Those who focus on intellectual property law 
generally perceive the law as directed towards providing an incentive 
for authors and inventors to produce, disseminate, and commercialize 
creative achievements.138 Conversely, the study results show that the 
public at large primarily views intellectual property rights as deriving 
from authors’ and inventors’ natural rights in their creative 
achievement.139 This result was consistent across all conditions and all 
scenarios.140 This general public perception comports with a collection 
of evidence compiled by Jeanne Fromer indicating that the creators of 
many artistic and scientific works believe in some form of natural rights 
to their works.141 Given that individuals with a natural rights perspective 
were found to prefer stronger intellectual property protection than 
individuals with other bases, this may lead to a public perception that 
intellectual property rights should be stronger than they currently are.  
Note that this discussion is not intended to claim, or disclaim, that an 
incentive theory of intellectual property rights is the appropriate 
normative basis for intellectual property protection. If intellectual 
property law is going to be designed based on an incentive model of 
behavior, however, it can only succeed if people respond to the law in 
                                                                                                                     
 137. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 11, at 290 (noting that people make inferences about 
what can be owned and which rights are conferred by ownership when reasoning about physical 
property). 
 138.  See supra Section I.B. 
 139. See supra Subsection I.B.5 and Figure 5. 
 140. The lone exception to this statement concerned the creativity threshold patent 
scenario, where there was not a statistically significant difference between the 47% of 
respondents who selected a natural rights basis and the 40% of respondents who selected an 
incentive basis. It is unclear why this scenario condition produced a different response, but it is 
possible that the focus on needing to achieve an invention of a certain level of creativity 
highlighted the potential push that intellectual property rights may provide. 
 141. Fromer, supra note 2, at 1764–78. 
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the anticipated behavioral manner. The lack of public understanding 
concerning intellectual property law and the mismatch between popular 
and expert conceptions of the basis for intellectual property rights raise 
strong questions concerning whether the model on which intellectual 
property law is based can succeed.142 Various studies indicate that law 
usually functions best when it is in accord with popular beliefs, and that 
there are limits on the extent to which legal rules can modify human 
behavior.143 The divide between intellectual property law and public 
perception concerning both the content of, and basis for, the law runs 
contrary to these teachings and will undermine both the legitimacy and 
the effectiveness of intellectual property law.144 
D.  Intellectual Property Demographics 
Some of the most important findings from this study concerned 
individuals’ divergence of opinion on preferences for the strength of 
intellectual property rights. As reported above, being older, having 
lower income, being more educated, and having less intellectual 
property experience all correlate with a preference for stronger 
intellectual property protection. Figure 6 displays these effects 
graphically. This differentiation has important implications for several 
ongoing intellectual property debates.  
                                                                                                                     
 142. See Janis & Holbrook, supra note 2, at 74–75 (discussing how a lack of awareness of 
patent law on the part of potential creators complicates the incentive theory of patent law). 
 143. E.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES 4–5, 10 (1991) (using anthropological and sociological studies to show how people 
tend to govern themselves based on social norms, not law). 
 144. See, e.g., MacCoun et al., supra note 5, at 347 (explaining that marijuana prohibition 
laws cannot be effective deterrents if the public is unaware of them); Tyler, supra note 5, at 
380-81 (explaining how widespread public consent is crucial to legitimacy of the legal system 
and that legitimacy is important for the legal system’s ability to function properly); John M. 
Darley et al., The Ex Ante Function of Criminal Law, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 165, 183 (2001) 
(explaining that the law’s credibility can be undermined when it does not accord with public 
norms). 
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The finding that younger people prefer weaker intellectual property 
rights is consistent with past studies that have found similar results 
when examining attitudes toward file sharing on the Internet.145 There 
does appear to be a generational divide concerning intellectual property 
protection. Interesting, here, is that most past research has focused on 
individual attitudes towards copyright protection, primarily in the 
context of the Internet, while the present study finds an age effect for 
the full population, across the patent and copyright conditions. This 
study appears to be the first to indicate that the generational divide 
concerning intellectual property rights cuts across intellectual property 
domains. 
Perhaps more surprising, the regressions reveal that having lower 
income correlates with a desire for stronger intellectual property rights. 
One possible explanation for this result is that the popular notion of the 
small innovator hitting it big with a creative achievement may be 
particularly attractive to those with lower income.146 For those with 
                                                                                                                     
 145. Bootie Cosgrove-Mather, Poll: Young Say File Sharing OK, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 
2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/18/opinion/polls/main573990.shtml (reporting 
survey results finding that 29% of adults under age thirty felt music sharing was always 
acceptable, while only 9% of those age thirty and older agreed); Press Release, Digital Life 
America, Americans Divided Over File Sharing (June 21, 2005), http://www.srgnet.com/wp-
content/uploads/dla-release-june-21_051.pdf (reporting survey results finding that those under 
age thirty favored allowing file sharing services on average, while those over age thirty were 
opposed). 
 146. This view would be somewhat analogous to data indicating that some support for 
repeal of the estate tax by those who are less well-off (and unlikely to ever benefit from such 
repeal) is based on a statistically unrealistic perception about the likelihood that one is going to 
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higher income, intellectual property rights may be perceived as being 
more likely to interfere with established business operations. Consistent 
with this analysis, smaller companies tend to prefer stronger patent 
rights than larger companies, in part for these reasons.147 
The study also finds an overall effect on intellectual property 
strength preferences with respect to an individual’s education: being 
more educated correlates with a preference for greater intellectual 
property protection. Though the causal explanation for this relationship 
is not necessarily clear, more educated individuals may tend to perceive 
a greater likelihood of being able to personally profit off of their own 
creativity or inventiveness. In addition, more educated individuals could 
place a higher value on creativity and innovation. 
That people with greater intellectual property experience prefer 
weaker intellectual property protection may seem incongruous at first. It 
is entirely consistent, however, with such individuals tending to view 
intellectual property rights through more of an incentive lens, which 
correlates with a preference for weaker rights.148 That is, as individuals 
gain experience with the intellectual property system, they likely 
become more familiar with (or indoctrinated into) the incentive theory 
on which intellectual property policy is based. Consistent with this 
analysis, Pearson’s Correlation reveals a statistically significant 
relationship between experience with intellectual property and an 
individual’s beliefs about the basis for intellectual property rights 
(r = .108, n = 1719, p < .001). In a similar vein, those who are 
experienced with intellectual property also may be more likely to realize 
that granting weaker intellectual property rights leads to greater access 
to creative achievements for those who want to use or improve upon 
earlier works. Intellectual property protection often presents a two-way 
street. This more nuanced understanding, requiring a balance of the 
                                                                                                                     
strike it rich and be subject to the tax. But see MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY 
A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 124–25 (2005) 
(“[A]lthough people have unrealistic ideas about their prospects for upward mobility . . . , there 
is substantial evidence that this distortion does not account for their hostility to the [estate] tax, 
or at any rate not exclusively.”). 
 147. See MERGES, supra note 45, at 212; Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology 
Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERK. 
TECH. L.J. 1255, 1288 (2009). 
 148. Participants who responded that they had experience with intellectual property were 
dominated by those who answered that they had copyrighted a work or who selected “other” in 
response to the experience question. Unsurprisingly, there were few people who had worked as 
an intellectual property attorney or paralegal in the participant pool. Of the 1,719 participants 
who took part in the study, 221 (12.9%) identified some experience with intellectual property. 
Eighty (4.7%) of the participants reported that they had copyrighted a work, 35 (2.0%) had 
patented a work, 12 (.7%) had worked as an intellectual property attorney, 13 (0.8%) as an 
intellectual property paralegal, and 122 (7.1%) identified other experience. As can be seen from 
summing the results, respondents could identify multiple types of experience. 
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rights of creators against the rights of users and improvers, could lead to 
a desire for weaker rights when compared with individuals who lack 
experience with intellectual property law, and who consequently are 
less cognizant of the cost of this access tradeoff. 
The results that those with greater experience prefer weaker 
intellectual property rights may appear partially inconsistent with a 
finding from prior research indicating that individuals with “serious 
involvement” in art tend to prefer stronger intellectual property rights in 
art in certain regards.149 However, this disparity is likely explained by 
differences in the study populations: Whereas the current study utilized 
a national population, the prior research involved only subjects with 
serious involvement in art. 
For the patent conditions, the results indicate that being more 
conservative correlates with a preference for stronger patent protection. 
This result could arise from a greater propensity for conservatives to 
desire to protect private property rights in general.150 That said, we 
would also need to understand why political ideology tends to cause 
individuals to view intellectual property rights as similar to private 
property rights, rather than viewing intellectual property rights as 
government interference in the free market. The latter perspective 
would produce the opposite effect to that found in the study, with 
conservatives generally opposing, and liberals supporting, intellectual 
property rights. Future studies that compare individual attitudes toward 
real property versus intellectual property rights would be beneficial for 
understanding these relationships.151 
                                                                                                                     
 149. See Barbara A. Spellman & Frederick Schauer, Artists’ Moral Rights and Psychology 
of Ownership, 83 TUL. L. REV. 661, 671–72 (2009). 
 150. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s 
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 493 (2002); Lino A. Graglia, The Myth of a 
Conservative Supreme Court: The October 2000 Term, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 281, 
297-98 (2003); see also Matthew Sag et al., Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual 
Property: An Empirical Study, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 801, 811–15 (2009) (hypothesizing that 
conservatives might support intellectual property rights based on their support of property rights 
generally, but also suggesting that intellectual property rights may be in conflict with 
conservative dislike of government intervention in the market). 
 151. There are limited studies concerning public attitudes toward property rights in general. 
Some studies have found that homeowners are more opposed to eminent domain activities by 
governmental entities than renters. E.g., MONMOUTH UNIV., THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN: ACCEPTABLE USES ARE FEW SAY GARDEN STATE RESIDENTS 4 (2005); N.J. ASS’N 
OF REALTORS, SMART GROWTH SURVEY (2008). While homeownership (versus renting) is 
expected to correlate with wealth and income, questions on eminent domain are too closely 
linked to homeownership to be able to extend these results to wealth or income effects more 
generally. See also Oliver R. Goodenough & Gregory Decker, Why Do Good People Steal 
Intellectual Property?, in LAW, MIND AND BRAIN 345, 345 (Michael Freeman & Oliver R. 
Goodenough eds., 2009) (arguing that norms around property rights operate differently than 
norms around intellectual property rights); Mohsen Manesh, The Immorality of Theft, the 
Amorality of Infringement, 2006 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, ¶ 41 (positing that cognitive concepts 
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Finally, among those who believe in a natural rights basis for 
intellectual property rights, women tend to prefer stronger patent rights 
than men. A growing body of scholarship has begun to explore the 
relationship between gender and intellectual property law, some of 
which argues that intellectual property law displays a male-gendered 
bias in certain regards.152 The results of this study could provide support 
for some of these contentions, indicating differences among men and 
women in their preferences for the strength of intellectual property 
protection. In a similar vein, among those who believe in an expressive 
basis for intellectual property rights, minorities tend to prefer stronger 
copyright protection than do whites.  
The relative lack of predictive power of the independent variables in 
the copyright context, both in terms of the overall strength of the 
regression model and the more limited number of significant 
interactions, compared to the patent context, is intriguing. There are a 
number of possible explanations for this, one of which may be that 
patent protection feels more similar to real property to some, whereas 
people are less sure about how to characterize or conceptualize 
copyright protection. This explanation would be consistent with the 
finding that more conservative participants tended to favor stronger 
rights in the patent conditions, just as conservatives tend to favor 
stronger rights in the real property context.153 Further investigation 
would be valuable to better understand the contours of these 
interactions, and also to explore some of the causal relationships that are 
hypothesized above. 
The results from the regression analyses indicate that different 
factors likely influence people’s evaluation of similar artistic versus 
inventive creativity. This divergence in public perception about types of 
creativity continues despite the fact that research on the psychology of 
creativity indicates that the cognitive faculties that drive inventive and 
artistic creativity are not so disparate.154 To the extent popular 
perceptions of creativity are misfounded, such misunderstanding may 
have a deleterious effect on intellectual property law. As discussed 
above, public perceptions may influence the law, both through popular 
                                                                                                                     
of intellectual property are distinct from those of tangible property). 
 152. Ann Bartow, Fair Use and the Fairer Sex: Gender, Feminism, and Copyright Law, 14 
AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 551, 552 (2006) (discussing gender bias in the development 
of and profit from copyrightable work); Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Eligible Patent Matter—
Gender Analysis of Patent Law: International and Comparative Perspectives, 19 AM. U.J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 851, 857 (2011) (“Accordingly, the law of invention is neither 
objective nor neutral but contains a built-in gender bias.”). 
 153. See Fallon, supra note 150, at 493; Graglia, supra note 150, at 297-98. 
 154. See JOHN S. DACEY & KATHLEEN H. LENNON, UNDERSTANDING CREATIVITY: THE 
INTERPLAY OF BIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND SOCIAL FACTORS 203–06 (1998); THERESA 
AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT 124–27 (1996). 
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political pressure and through lawmakers’ personal perceptions.155 
Misunderstandings concerning the creative process, or concerning the 
relationships between artistic and inventive creativity, could therefore 
result in intellectual property law that is poorly suited to achieving its 
desired ends. 
The findings from the regression analyses also have significant 
implications concerning ongoing intellectual property debates, such as 
the continuing SOPA/PIPA conflict, disputes over the patent eligibility 
of human genes that played out in the Myriad Genetics litigation,156 and 
recent Supreme Court intellectual property cases.157 The analyses reveal 
certain cultural divides over intellectual property rights that have not 
previously been identified, but that could have significant influence on 
the discourse and outcomes of these and future intellectual property 
disputes. 
IV.  THE PSYCHOLOGY OF OWNERSHIP 
The psychology of ownership is a branch of psychology that 
investigates human cognition concerning the concept of ownership.158 
Most work in this area to date has concerned the ownership of physical 
property. For example, psychologists have found that people make 
judgments about who should own a physical object based on who has 
done the work necessary to capture the object and bring it into 
possession.159 Psychological discernment of ownership of physical 
property emerges at an extremely early age; it has been found in 
children as young as three years old.160 While we now know a 
                                                                                                                     
 155. Deborah W. Denno, The Perils of Public Opinion, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 741, 761–62 
(2000). 
 156. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116–19 
(2013) (holding that isolated DNA is not patent-eligible because it is naturally occurring, but 
that synthetically created or modified DNA could be patent-eligible).  
 157. E.g., Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 
1761, 1764 (2013) (holding that the patent exhaustion doctrine does not apply to the offspring of 
patented seeds); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2011), rev’d, 133 
S. Ct. 1351, 1355–56 (2013) (applying the “first sale” doctrine of the Copyright Act of 1976 to 
works manufactured overseas and imported and resold in the United States); Already, L.L.C. v. 
Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721 (2013) (holding that the federal district court is divested of Article III 
jurisdiction over a federal trademark case where the registrant promised not to assert its mark 
against the underlying commercial activities); FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 
(2013) (holding that a reverse settlement agreement between brand name and generic 
pharmaceutical companies that resulted in delay of generic commercialization may be 
anticompetitive). 
 158.  See Ori Friedman, Necessary for Possession: How People Reason About the 
Acquisition of Ownership, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1161, 1161 (2010). 
 159. Id. at 1166. 
 160. Karen R. Neary et al., Preschoolers Infer Ownership from “Control of Permission,” 
45 DEV. PSYCHOL. 873, 875 (2009); Nicholaus S. Noles & Frank C. Keil, Exploring Ownership 
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significant amount about public perception concerning the ownership of 
real and physical personal property, our knowledge of the public 
perception of intangible or intellectual property is in its infancy. 
A limited number of psychology studies have begun to explore the 
psychological conception of ownership for intellectual property. Adults 
in many cultures recognize the ownership of ideas and believe that 
plagiarizing others’ ideas is wrong.161 It appears that this concept of the 
ownership of ideas develops later than concepts of ownership of 
physical property. Six-year-old, but not four-year-old, children make 
negative moral evaluations of those who plagiarize the work of others 
versus those who produce unique works.162 These judgments indicate an 
understanding that others have differentiated ideas and that copying 
those ideas is problematic, at least in certain contexts. Children at this 
age, however, evaluate stealing physical property much more negatively 
than stealing other people’s ideas.163 Further studies have found that 
children value the contribution of ideas to an artistic endeavor more 
than the contribution of labor.164 Comparable studies of adult perception 
surrounding the ownership of ideas have not been reported.165 
In a related vein, some studies have found that there can be a 
perception of a transfer of ownership rights over physical property due 
to the investment of creative labor in physical property.166 Adults were 
inclined to conclude that a person who manipulated clay into a figure 
was entitled to the work product, rather than the original owner of the 
clay.167 While three-year-old children never recognized creative labor as 
a basis for transferring ownership, some four-year-old children began to 
justify ownership transfer based on creative investment.168 This 
indicates that concepts of owning intellectual property and acquiring 
ownership of intellectual property begin to emerge at a young age. 
                                                                                                                     
in a Developmental Context, in ORIGINS OF OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY 100–01 (Hildy Ross & 
Ori Friedman eds., 2011). 
 161. Kristina R. Olson & Alex Shaw, “No Fair, Copycat!”: What Children’s Response to 
Plagiarism Tells Us About Their Understanding of Ideas, 14 DEV. SCI. 431, 432 (2011). 
 162. Id. at 434–37. 
 163. See id. at 435–38. 
 164. Vivian Li et al., Ideas Versus Labor: What Do Children Value in Artistic Creation?, 
127 COGNITION 38, 42-43 (2013). Studies have not yet examined whether this effect exists for 
inventive as well as artistic creation. 
 165. Note that these studies concern a form of ownership rights in ideas, rights that would 
not be protected by intellectual property law. Both copyright and patent law preclude intellectual 
property rights for ideas per se; intellectual property protection exists only for manners of 
expressing or instantiating ideas. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 556 (1985); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010). 
 166. Patricia Kanngiesser et al., The Effect of Creative Labor on Property-Ownership 
Transfer by Preschool Children and Adults, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1236, 1240–41 (2010). 
 167. Id. at 1237–38. 
 168. Id. at 1240. 
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Intriguingly, these concepts of intellectual property ownership 
appear rooted in a natural rights basis for intellectual property 
protection. Though the psychology experiments discussed above were 
not designed to test this issue, the results indicate that children’s and 
adults’ recognition of the ownership of creative works is based in the 
investment of creative labor. In the study testing the transfer of 
ownership via the investment of creative labor, 67% of adults referred 
to concepts of creative investment in explaining the basis for the 
transfer of ownership rights.169 These results are consistent with the 
findings of the present study—that people understand intellectual 
property rights based on the natural rights of creators rather than based 
on a system designed to incentivize the creation and dissemination of 
intellectual works. 
The psychology of ownership also implicates the cognitive heuristic 
of the “endowment effect.” The endowment effect refers to the well-
established phenomenon that individuals tend to value goods that they 
own more highly than identical goods owned by others.170 Professors 
Christopher Buccafusco and Christopher Sprigman have conducted a 
series of experiments that indicate the endowment effect occurs for 
intellectual property as well as for physical property, finding that 
owners of poems and of paintings valued the works more than potential 
buyers.171 Separate from this endowment effect, creators also are 
influenced by a “creativity effect.”172 Individuals who painted paintings 
believed that the paintings were worth more than individuals placed in 
the position of owning the paintings.173 The creativity effect appears to 
be based on an overly optimistic assessment of the quality of the work, 
rather than an emotional attachment to the work or the amount of time 
and energy invested in the work.174 This creativity effect again appears 
more aligned with a natural rights or expressive basis for intellectual 
property rights, as opposed to an incentive basis. The present study 
enhances our understanding of the psychology of intellectual property, 
providing significantly more detail concerning the contours of public 
perception and preferences in this area than was previously available. 
                                                                                                                     
 169. Id. at 1238. 
 170. Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
1227, 1228 (2003); Richard Thaler, Towards a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 44 (1980). 
 171. See Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 9, at 32; Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 
37, at 4, 39–40. 
 172. Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 9, at 32.  
 173. Id. at 39-40. 
 174. See id. at 41–42. 
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CONCLUSION 
In a world where intellectual property rights have become 
significantly more prevalent, important, and contentious, the 
experiments reported here shed new light on the popular understanding 
of intellectual property law and intellectual property rights. This study 
has significant implications for intellectual property law and policy, as 
the intellectual property system is premised on producing a certain set 
of behavioral effects. The results of this study indicate that the 
behavioral model of incentives on which the intellectual property 
system is based cannot function optimally because popular conceptions 
of intellectual property rights are not in accord with actual intellectual 
property law. This discord can destabilize the legitimacy and the 
effectiveness of intellectual property law. 
The variance found here between public perception and intellectual 
property law indicates that potential intellectual property producers 
likely do not receive appropriate incentives to engage in creative 
endeavors, to work with others on creative projects, or to commercialize 
and distribute their intellectual work. Likewise, intellectual property 
users likely do not receive appropriate signals concerning compliance 
with intellectual property rights. These public perceptions are also 
highly likely to influence juror, as well as some judicial and legislative, 
decision-making concerning intellectual property rights. The intellectual 
property system will remain hard-pressed to achieve its objectives given 
the widespread disconnect between the public psychology of intellectual 
property and the reality of intellectual property law. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Scenario Two: Creativity Threshold 
 
[creativity threshold scenario: copyright condition] 
 
Alex is a writer who has just completed a new fictional book. Though 
Alex’s story is new, both the writing style and story are somewhat 
predictable. Stated another way, the book would be considered obvious 
in comparison to existing works from the perspective of someone with 
ordinary skill and experience in Alex’s field. 
 
The following question concerns whether Alex should be entitled to 
Intellectual Property protection for the book. Intellectual Property 
protection would give Alex the exclusive rights to make and sell copies 
of the book. Anyone who wanted a copy of Alex’s book would have to 
obtain permission from Alex, and Alex could charge a fee for that 
permission. 
 
Should Alex be entitled to Intellectual Property protection for the book? 
Please answer by selecting a number on the following scale ranging 
from “Definitely Not” to “Definitely Yes.” 
 
1 – Definitely Not 
2 – Probably Not 
3 – Perhaps Not 
4 – Maybe 
5 – Perhaps Yes 
6 – Probably Yes 
7 – Definitely Yes 
 
 
********** 
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[creativity threshold scenario: patent condition] 
 
Alex is a scientist who has just completed a new mechanical invention. 
Though Alex’s invention is new, both the development and invention 
are somewhat predictable. Stated another way, the invention would be 
considered obvious in comparison to existing works from the 
perspective of someone with ordinary skill and experience in Alex’s 
field. 
 
The following question concerns whether Alex should be entitled to 
Intellectual Property protection for the invention. Intellectual Property 
protection would give Alex the exclusive rights to make and sell copies 
of the invention. Anyone who wanted a copy of Alex’s invention would 
have to obtain permission from Alex, and Alex could charge a fee for 
that permission. 
 
Should Alex be entitled to Intellectual Property protection for the 
invention? Please answer by selecting a number on the following scale 
ranging from “Definitely Not” to “Definitely Yes.” 
 
1 – Definitely Not 
2 – Probably Not 
3 – Perhaps Not 
4 – Maybe 
5 – Perhaps Yes 
6 – Probably Yes 
7 – Definitely Yes 
 
 
********** 
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Scenario Four: Joint Creator 
 
[joint creator scenario: copyright condition] 
 
Blair is a songwriter who recently completed an initial version of a new 
song. Blair contacts Cary, another songwriter who Blair has heard about 
but never worked with before, and asks Cary for feedback on the song, 
particularly concerning one section of the song that Blair feels does not 
really work well. Cary considers the song and gives feedback to Blair, 
including on the portion that Blair identified. Blair decides that Cary’s 
recommendations solve Blair’s earlier concerns and incorporates some 
of them into the final song. In total, Cary’s feedback was responsible for 
about twenty percent, or one-fifth, of the final song. 
 
Assume that Blair is entitled to Intellectual Property rights in the final 
song. The following question concerns whether Cary should be entitled 
to share Intellectual Property rights in the final song with Blair. Sharing 
Intellectual Property rights would give Cary equal rights to distribute 
and sell copies of the song, and to grant other people rights to copy the 
song. 
 
Should Cary be entitled to share Intellectual Property rights in the final 
song? Please answer by selecting a number on the following scale 
ranging from “Definitely Not” to “Definitely Yes.” 
 
1 – Definitely Not 
2 – Probably Not 
3 – Perhaps Not 
4 – Maybe 
5 – Perhaps Yes 
6 – Probably Yes 
7 – Definitely Yes 
 
 
********** 
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[joint creator scenario: patent condition] 
 
Blair is a software writer who recently completed an initial version of a 
new program. Blair contacts Cary, another software writer who Blair 
has heard about but never worked with before, and asks Cary for 
feedback on the program, particularly concerning one section of the 
program that Blair feels does not really work well. Cary considers the 
program and gives feedback to Blair, including on the portion that Blair 
identified. Blair decides that Cary’s recommendations solve Blair’s 
earlier concerns and incorporates some of them into the final program. 
In total, Cary’s feedback was responsible for about twenty percent, or 
one-fifth, of the final software program. 
 
Assume that Blair is entitled to Intellectual Property rights in the final 
program. The following question concerns whether Cary should be 
entitled to share Intellectual Property rights in the final program with 
Blair. Sharing Intellectual Property rights would give Cary equal rights 
to distribute and sell copies of the program, and to grant other people 
rights to copy the program. 
 
Should Cary be entitled to share Intellectual Property rights in the final 
software program? Please answer by selecting a number on the 
following scale ranging from “Definitely Not” to “Definitely Yes.” 
 
1 – Definitely Not 
2 – Probably Not 
3 – Perhaps Not 
4 – Maybe 
5 – Perhaps Yes 
6 – Probably Yes 
7 – Definitely Yes 
 
 
********** 
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